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Abstract 
 This empirical dissertation consists of three essays on mergers and regulation in the U.S. 
telecommunications industry.  An abstract for each of the three essays follows. 
Essay 1:  This study has attempted to measure the productivity growth associated with 25 
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) over the period 1996-2005 using a Malmquist 
productivity index.  The average efficiency scores for our sample companies have not changed 
significantly between 1996 and 2005, which indicates that the average ILECs shows no 
measurable improvement in terms of optimizing their input-output combinations over time.  We 
find some empirical evidence of a positive merger effect, although this effect diminishes over 
time.  In addition, we find that non-merged firms underperform in terms of average productivity 
growth. 
Essay 2:  This study analyzes the merger effects for 25 ILECs over the period 1996-2005 
using stochastic frontier analysis with a time-varying inefficiency model. In addition, we conduct 
a comparison of indices between the stochastic frontier analysis and the Malmquist index method. 
The empirical results indicate that the sample of telecommunications firms has experienced 
deterioration in average productivity growth following the mergers.  In addition, both approaches 
suggest that firms that do not merge underperform in terms of average productivity growth. 
Essay 3: This essay investigates whether the substitution of price cap regulation (PCR), along 
with other regulatory regimes, for traditional rate of return regulation (RRR) has had a 
measurable effect on productivity growth in the U.S. telecommunications industry.  A stochastic 
frontier approach, which differs from previous studies, is employed to compute efficiency 
 change, technological progress, and productivity growth for 25 LECs over the period 1988-1998.  
By examining the relationship between the change in productivity growth and regulatory regime 
variables, while controlling for other effects, we find that PCR and other regulatory regimes have 
a positive effect on productivity growth.  However, only PCR has a significant and positive 
effect in both contemporaneous and lagged model specifications. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
This dissertation is comprised of three empirical essays that investigate mergers and regulation in 
the U.S. telecommunications industry.  The first two essays address the effect of a series of 
mergers in the telecommunications industry after the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act (1996 Act).  The third essay analyzes the effect of implementation of incentive regulation in 
telecommunications industry.  
The primary objective of Chapter 2 is to investigate whether productivity growth has 
increased among incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) that have merged since the 1996 
Telecommunications Act and whether the merged firms performed better than firms that did not 
merge in terms of productivity growth during the period 1996-2005 . 
Mergers can be either a pro-competitive or anti-competitive in terms of their effect on 
industry performance, including productive efficiency.  The horizontal merger guidelines (HMG) 
of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) rely, in part, upon market concentration in evaluating 
whether particular mergers raise anticompetitive concerns.  In addition to market concentration, 
the HMG also take into account potential adverse competitive effects and entry analysis in 
evaluating proposed mergers.  Specifically, Section 4 of the HMG (revised April 8, 1997) 
describes the significance of merger efficiencies.  When the efficiency gains from a merger, 
which may result in lower prices or quality improvements, are expected to outweigh the other 
effects of the merger that may serve to lessen competition, the agency will consider approving 
the proposed merger.  These observations notwithstanding, it is difficult in practice to verify and 
quantify these merger efficiencies.  
A Malmquist productivity growth index introduced by Caves et al. (1982) and further 
developed by Färe et al. (1994) is employed to compute productivity growth, which is comprised 
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of technical efficiency change and technological change.  In addition, this essay measures firm-
level technical efficiencies using dynamic data envelope analysis (DEA) to evaluate the ILECs’ 
ability to optimize output over time.   
The main findings of this essay indicate that mergers positively affect average 
productivity growth, but that this effect decreases over time.  In addition, firms that have not 
merged under-perform firms that have merged in terms of average productivity growth. 
The primary objective of Chapter 3 is to evaluate the effectiveness of mergers that 
occurred between 1996 and 2005 using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).  This essay 
investigates whether productivity growth has increased among ILECs that have merged since the 
1996 Act and whether the merged firms performed better than those firms that did not merge.  
The second objective is to compare the results on productivity growth between the SFA and the 
Malmquist index approach.  This comparison provides useful information on the robustness of 
the efficiency findings across different approaches.     
One of the methods that may be used to examine efficiencies is to measure productivity 
growth, inclusive of its underlying components--technological progress and changes in technical 
efficiency.  From a policy perspective, the decomposition of productivity growth into these 
components provides important information for analysis.  For example, if policymakers are able 
to determine the key drivers of productivity growth, they may adopt policies that can 
significantly improve the performance of firms in the industry and hence the overall economy.  
Suppose, for example, that a lack of technological progress is the source of low productivity 
growth.  It would then be possible to adopt various policies that serve to stimulate technological 
innovation and move the technology frontier outward over time.  If high rates of technological 
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change associated with low rates of efficiency change are measured, then policy makers may 
focus on the policy that increases the efficiency of the individual firms. 
Chapter 3 finds that the firm sample has experienced deterioration in average productivity 
growth following the merger.  This empirical finding is attributed to technological regression, a 
finding that may lead policymakers to consider implementing policies that serve to shift out the 
production frontier over time.  In terms of average growth in productivity, the only firm in the 
sample not to have merged ranks third lowest among the 25 ILECs.  
Another component of this chapter is a comparison of indices for the stochastic frontier 
analysis and the Malmquist index method.  This comparison provides useful information on 
robustness.  With the exception of one firm using the Malmquist index method, both methods 
indicate that every firm in the sample has experienced negative annual growth in technological 
change.  Indices of productivity growth suggest that most of the firms experience negative 
growth in annual productivity growth following the merger across both methods.  However, in 
terms of productivity growth, it is noteworthy that the only firm not to have merged 
underperforms relative to the firms that have merged during the post-merger periods.  In SFA, 
annual productivity growth for BellSouth is the third lowest in the sample and the fourth lowest 
using the Malmquist index method. 
The primary objective of Chapter 4 is to measure productivity growth associated with 
technological progress and changes in technical efficiency in order to examine the improvement 
in the local exchange carriers’ (LECs’) productivity growth.  In addition, this essay analyzes the 
effects associated with the adoption of incentive regulation on the LECs’ productivity growth 
rate.  
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A large volume of research has examined the effects of the implementation of incentive 
regulation regimes.  Schmalensee and Rohlfs (1992) examined the effect of price cap regulation 
(PCR) on productivity gains.  They found that the cumulative productivity gains increased $1.8 
billion over the period of price cap regulation (PCR) relative to the pre price-cap period. 
Majumdar (1997) employed a non-parametric approach, commonly referred to as data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), to examine the effect of incentive regulation on the productive 
performance of 45 local exchange carriers (LECs) over the period 1988-1993.  He showed that 
PCR has a positive but lagged effect on technical efficiency.  Uri (2001) used a Malmquist index 
to measure the change in productivity growth following the implementation of incentive 
regulation.  He found that productivity growth increased by approximately 5 percent per year for 
the 19 LECs over the period 1988-1999.  
Although a number of empirical studies have found that the effect of incentive regulation 
on productivity growth in the U.S. telecommunications industry is substantially positive, some 
have concluded that the effect of incentive regulation is ambiguous.  For example, Resende 
(1999) estimated a translog cost function combined with a total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
decomposition for the period 1989-1994.  He found that incentive regulation did not enhance the 
level of productive efficiency.  Uri (2002) employed a corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) 
approach to measure the efficiency gains associated with the implementation of incentive 
regulation in the U.S. telecommunications industry.  Using data from 19 LECs over the 1988-
1999 period, he found no empirical evidence that incentive regulation had enhanced technical 
efficiency. 
The results of Chapter 4 broadly indicate that the adoption of PCR and incentive 
regulation (IR), more generally, has had a positive impact on operating performance in the U.S. 
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telecommunications industry.  By examining the relationship between productivity growth and  
regulatory regime variables, while controlling for all other effects, we find that PCR and other 
forms of incentive regulation have a positive effect on productivity growth.  It is noteworthy, 
however, that only PCR has a significant and positive effect on productivity growth in both 
contemporaneous and lagged model specifications.    
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CHAPTER 2 - Productivity Growth and Merger Efficiencies in the 
U.S. Telecommunications Industry 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1974, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an anti-trust suit against AT&T that was 
ultimately settled on January 8, 1982.1  On January 1, 1984, AT&T’s local operating companies 
were divested into seven independent Regional Holding Companies known as the Regional Bell 
Operating Companies (RBOCs). 2, 3 Following this divestiture, AT&T provided long distance 
service and the seven RBOCs provided primarily local telephone service and intraLATA long-
distance service.4  The RBOCs were prohibited from providing interLATA long-distance service.  
This de facto quarantine imposed on the RBOCs was designed to spur competition in long-
distance and telecommunications equipment markets.  The expectation was that the gains from 
the ensuing competition would outweigh the loss of economies of scope that derive from the 
joint provision of local and long distance telecommunications (Baxter, 1991, p.30).    
The passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act (1996 Act) was the next significant 
event designed to further stimulate competition in telecommunications markets.5  This statute 
required local exchange carriers (LECs) to unbundle their networks and share the component 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 2 in Sappington and Weisman (1996) for a detailed history of these industry developments.  
2 The seven RBOCs were Ameritech Corporation, Bell Atlantic Corporation, BellSouth Corporation, NYNEX 
Corporation, Pacific Telesis Group, Southwestern Bell Corporation and U S West, Inc.  
3 In addition to the seven RBOCs, two smaller companies, Cincinnati Bell and Southern New England Telephone 
(SNET), became stand-alone companies after the settlement. There were also several operating companies such as 
GTE, United, Continental and Central telephone system that are known as independent telephone companies 
because they were never part of the Bell System.   
4 As part of the break-up of AT&T, the U.S. was partitioned into approximately 161 local access transport areas or 
LATAs. The RBOCs were restricted to providing intraLATA long distance service.  This essentially meant that the 
RBOCs could not provide long distance service across area code boundaries. 
5 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is divided into seven Sections. Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange 
Carriers (ILECs) were in Title I. Additional duties of ILECs include negotiation, interconnection, unbundled access, 
resale, notice of changes and collocation. 
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inputs, or “unbundled network elements” (UNEs), with rivals at regulatory prescribed rates if 
“the failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the 
telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer” (Section 
251(d)(2)(B)). 6   Consequently, the 1996 Act gave rise to a new group of communications 
carriers known as competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) that compete directly with 
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). 7  Section 271 of the 1996 Act also provided a 
mechanism through which the RBOCs could re-enter the interLATA long-distance market.  
A significant amount of industry consolidation followed in the aftermath of the passage 
of the 1996 Act.8  This consolidation was primarily directed at increasing economies of scale in 
the provision of local telephone service and also re-capturing the economies of scope that had 
been sacrificed as part of the AT&T divestiture.  Southwestern Bell Corporation (SBC, now 
at&t) was perhaps the most aggressive RBOC in this consolidation campaign.   
SBC acquired Pacific Telesis Group, Southern New England Telephone and Ameritech in 
1997, 1998 and 1999, respectively.  A merger between Bell Atlantic and GTE formed Verizon in 
2000.  U.S. West agreed to merge with QWEST Communications in 1999 and this merger was 
approved by state and federal regulators in 2000.  In 2005, AT&T was acquired by SBC 
communications.  Shortly after this merger, the company was renamed at&t Inc.  Finally, 
Verizon acquired MCI in January 2006, followed by at&t’s December 2006 acquisition of 
                                                 
6 CLECs can lease UNEs and combine them with their own facilities to provide the retail telecommunications 
product. UNE-L, or the unbundled network loop, is example of this type of network element.  The UNE-L entails 
leasing the loop, which is the connection from the telephone exchange’s central office to the customer premises.  
UNE-P, or the unbundled network element platform, is a special type of resale in which the network inputs are 
combined for the entrant by the incumbent provider.  The price for UNE-P is lower than that of pure resale because 
it is based on TELRIC (total element long-run incremental cost) rather than avoided cost, but the two are 
functionally indistinguishable otherwise.  The Federal Communications Commission began phasing out UNE-P in 
2005 because it believed the availability of UNE-P was having an adverse effect on investment in network 
infrastructure.  See FCC (2005). 
7 At the time of the 1996 Act, the ILECs were comprised of local telephone companies, including the Regional Bell 
Operating Companies (RBOCs).  
8 The history of ILEC mergers from 1996 onward is shown in Table 1. 
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BellSouth Corporation—the last of the RBOCs to have retained its original corporate name 
following the 1984 AT&T divestiture.9, 10 
In general, mergers can be either pro-competitive or anti-competitive in terms of their 
effect on industry performance, including productive efficiency.  The horizontal merger 
guidelines (HMG) of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) rely, in part, upon market 
concentration in evaluating whether particular mergers raise anticompetitive concerns.  In 
addition to market concentration, the HMG also take into account potential adverse competitive 
effects and entry analysis in evaluating proposed mergers.  Specifically, Section 4 of the HMG 
(revised April 8, 1997) describes the significance of merger efficiencies.  When efficiency gains 
from a merger, which may result in lower prices or quality improvements, are expected to 
dominate the other effects of the merger that may serve to lessen competition, the agency would 
consider approving the proposed merger.  These observations notwithstanding, it is difficult in 
practice to verify and quantify these merger efficiencies.11  
A number of empirical studies have computed efficiency scores for the U.S. 
telecommunications industry, including Majumdar (1995, 1997), Resende (2000) and Resende 
and Facanha (2005).  And yet, most of the studies that examine efficiency in the 
telecommunications industry have concentrated on either the effects of different regulatory 
regimes or the impact of the AT&T divestiture.12  The measurement of efficiency gains with 
respect to mergers has heretofore been given surprisingly little attention in the literature. 
                                                 
9 Cincinnati Bell, which is not part of AT&T break-up, retains its brand name and continues to use the Bell logo.   
10 This trend continues in the wireless industry as well as the wireline industry.  For instance, in 2004, AT&T and 
Cingular Wireless merged and became the largest provider in the wireless industry.  Sprint PCS also merged with 
Nextel and adopted the brand Sprint-Nextel in 2005.  See Weisman (2007) for further discussion of these mergers 
and the economic factors driving them.  
11 The HMG of the DOJ introduced cognizable efficiencies that are merger-specific. The HMG (p. 31) indicate that 
“Cognizable efficiencies are assessed net of costs produced by the merger or incurred in achieving those 
efficiencies.”    
12 See Shin et al. (1992) and Krouse et al. (1999) for research on the effects of the AT&T divestiture. 
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In this essay, a Malmquist productivity growth index introduced by Caves et al. (1982) 
and further developed by Färe et al. (1994) is employed to compute productivity growth, which 
is comprised of technical efficiency change and technological change.13  A large number of 
papers employ the Malmquist index to measure productivity growth for a cross-section of 
industries.14  With specific reference to the telecommunications sector in the U.S., Uri (2001, 
2002) used a Malmquist index to measure the change in productivity growth following the 
implementation of incentive regulation.  He found that productivity growth increased by 
approximately 5 percent per year for the 19 LECs over the period 1988-1999.  
This study differs from Uri in three critical respects.  First, we investigate the 
effectiveness of mergers over the 1996 to 2005 time period.  We seek to determine whether 
productivity growth has increased for ILECs that have merged since the 1996 Act and whether 
the merged firms perform better than a firm that did not merge in terms of productivity growth.  
Employing a Malmquist index, we find that the change in productivity growth for merged firms 
is higher than that of firms that did not merge, ceteris paribus.  In contrast to Uri, our findings 
indicate that productivity growth decreased for most firms in the sample.  Second, our sample 
includes 25 LECs and therefore provides for a more robust analysis.  Third, we measure firm-
level technical efficiencies using dynamic DEA to evaluate the ILECs’ ability to optimize output 
over time.  
                                                 
13 Kwoka (1993) analyzed the impact of different regulatory policies on productivity growth for both AT&T and 
British Telecom (BT).  He found empirical evidence that both the privatization of BT and the divestiture of AT&T 
had a significant effect on productivity  growth.  Resende (1999) found no statistically significant relationship 
between incentive regulation and increased productivity growth.  Stranczak et al. (1994) investigated whether 
privatization and competition affect productivity growth in the telecommunications industry. They found no 
empirical evidence of a statistically significant relationship between long distance competition and productivity 
growth. 
14 For example, Färe et al. (1994) examined productivity growth in 17 OECD countries for the 1979-1988 period 
using the Malmquist index. They found that the country that has the highest productivity growth rate is Japan while 
that of the U.S. is slightly higher than average. Lall et al. (2002) also used the Malmquist index to measure 
productivity growth in over 30 countries in the Western Hemisphere over the 1978-1994 period.  They found that 
civil, economic, and political liberty played a significant role in productivity growth for Caribbean countries. 
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The remainder of this essay is organized as follows.  The analytical framework and 
theory used to measure productivity growth and the decomposition of the Malmquist index are 
described in Section 2.  In Section 3, the data used in this essay are discussed.  Section 4 
provides the empirical results for the DEA scores and changes in productivity growth.  We 
compare the pre-merger and post-merger productivity growth and technical efficiency change 
among ILECs that have merged since the 1996 Act relative to the ILEC that did not merge.15 
Finally, Section 5 contains a brief summary of the results and a conclusion. 
METHODLOGY 
There are two principal approaches to the estimation of production frontiers, the parametric 
method and the non-parametric method.  The Malmquist index approach employed in this essay 
is of the latter type.  One of the important advantages of using this index is the ability to 
decompose productivity growth rates into technical efficiency change and technological change.  
In addition, no explicit functional form for the frontier is required since the DEA approach uses 
linear programming.  DEA also allows for multiple inputs and multiple outputs that are not as 
easily estimated using parametric methods.  Another distinct advantage of using the DEA 
method in measuring productivity growth is that it does not require any price data.  Before 
turning to a discussion of the specific properties of the Malmquist index, we provide an overview 
of the DEA technique.16 
DEA is a linear programming method that uses data on the multiple input and output 
quantities to construct a hypersurface over the data points.  This hypersurface is constructed by 
the solution to a series of linear programming problems.  There are input-oriented and output-
oriented DEA methods.  The former is conducted by reducing the amount of all inputs 
                                                 
15 BellSouth Corporation is the only ILEC that had not merged prior to 2005. 
16 The first influential DEA model was developed by Charnes et al. (1978). 
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proportionally without a reduction in output.  The latter is conducted by determining the 
maximum proportional increase in output for any given level of input. 
 Output-oriented DEA is depicted in Figure 1.  There are two outputs ( )1 2,Y Y and five 
firms ( ), , , ,a b c d e .  Firms a , b  and c  are efficient since they lie on the production frontier. 
Calculating the technical efficiency score of firm d  is equivalent to: 
'
0
0
d
dTE
d
= .          (1) 
In similar fashion, the technical efficiency score for firm e  is equal to: 
'
0
0
e
eTE
e
= .          (2) 
Therefore, the value of the efficiency score lies between 0 and 1.  
 For firm d , the efficient target is 'd  which lies on the line segment joining points a andb .  
Firms a andb  are typically referred to as the peers of firm d .  In similar fashion, firm e ’s peers 
are firms b and c .  Note that the value of technical efficiency for firms a , b  and c are assigned 
the value of one and each firm is its own peer.  
We turn now to discuss the distance function that is required to construct a Malmquist 
index.  Based on Caves et al. (1982), we assume that for each time period 1, , ,t T= …  the 
production technology tF maps input vectors, t nx +∈R  into output vectors, t my +∈R ,17 
 ( ){ }, :  can produce t t t t tF x y x y= ,       (3) 
                                                 
17 The production technology is assumed to satisfy the following axioms in order to be a meaningful model of 
production: i) the possibility of inaction; ii) monotonicity of the output correspondence; iii) disposability of output; 
iv) the output set is closed; and v) irreversibility (Färe and Grosskopf, 1994). 
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where R  is the set of real numbers.  The production technology tF  is homogeneous of degree 1 
in output.  Following Shepard (1970), the output distance function is defined at time t  as: 
( ) ( ){ }( ) 1, inf : , sup : ,tt t t t t t t tO yD x y x F x y Fθ θ θθ −⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= ∈ = ∈⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭ .18   (4) 
The distance function ( ),t t tOD x y  is homogeneous of degree 1 in output.  Note that input-output 
vectors lie below the production technology set, which implies that ( ), 1t t tOD x y ≤  if and only if 
( ),t t tx y F∈ .  Moreover, ( ), 1t t tOD x y =  if and only if input-output combinations lie on the 
boundary of the production technology set that is illustrated in Figure 2.19  The value of the 
distance function evaluated at ( ),t tx y  is 2
2
1oa
oa
= , while the value of the distance function 
evaluated at ( )' ',t tx y  is 1
2
1oa
oa
< .20  In order to construct a Malmquist index, another distance 
function from a different time period is required.  This distance function is expressed as:  
( ) 11 1 1, inf : , tt t t t tO yD x y x Fθ θ
+
+ + +⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= ∈⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
  
( ){ }( ) 11 1sup : ,t t tx y Fθ θ −+ += ∈ .     (5) 
This distance function measures the maximal proportional change in output required to make 
( )1 1,t tx y+ +  feasible in relation to the technology at time t .  In Figure 2, production ( )1 1,t tx y+ +  
                                                 
18 The input distance function can be defined as follows: 
( ), su p : , .tt t t t tI xD x y y Fδ δ⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= ∈⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭   
19 Farrell (1957) referred to a firm as “technically efficient” when ( ), 1t t tOD x y = . 
20 Refer to Färe and Grosskopf (2000) for additional discussion of distance functions. 
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occurs outside the production possibility set at time t .  The value of the distance function for 
observation ( )1 1,t tx y+ +  relative to technology tF  is 4
3
1oa
oa
> . 
A Malmquist index is the ratio of two distance functions and is constructed as follows: 
( )
( )
1 1,
,
t t t
Ot
c t t t
O
D x y
M
D x y
+ +
= .21        (6) 
Färe et al. (1994) suggest using the output-based Malmquist index in order to avoid the use of an 
arbitrary benchmark: 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
, ,
, , ,
, ,
t t t t t t
O Ot t t t
O t t t t t t
O O
D x y D x y
M x y x y
D x y D x y
+ + + + +
+ +
+
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
.    (7) 
From the production frontier perspective, technical efficiency measures how far below 
the production frontier a particular firm’s technology resides.  Technological change implies 
technological innovation and it measures the extent to which that frontier moves outward/inward 
over time.  In order to decompose a Malmquist index into a technical efficiency change and 
technological change, (7) can be represented as: 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
, , ,
, , ,
, , ,
t t t t t t t t t
O O Ot t t t
O t t t t t t t t t
O O O
D x y D x y D x y
M x y x y
D x y D x y D x y
+ + + + +
+ +
+ + + +
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= × ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
,  (8) 
where 
( )
( )
1 1 1,
,
t t t
O
t t t
O
D x y
D x y
+ + +
 measures the change in relative efficiency (i.e., whether the production 
technology is moving closer to or farther away from the production frontier) between periods t  
                                                 
21 Technology in period t is treated as the base-case technology.  
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and 1t + . ( )( )
( )
( )
1 1
1 1 1 1
, ,
, ,
t t t t t t
O O
t t t t t t
O O
D x y D x y
D x y D x y
+ +
+ + + +
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 measures the shift in the technology frontier between 
the two periods evaluated at tx  and 1tx + .  
Therefore, the technical efficiency change (EC) is represented as: 
( )
( )
1 1 1,
,
t t t
O
t t t
O
D x y
EC
D x y
+ + +
= ,         (9) 
and technological change is represented as: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1
1 1 1 1
, ,
, ,
t t t t t t
O O
t t t t t t
O O
D x y D x y
TC
D x y D x y
+ +
+ + + +
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
.      (10) 
Hence, if there is no change in inputs and outputs between periods t  and 1t + , the Malmquist 
index is one.  Note that EC and TC are not necessarily equal to one since the Malmquist index is 
the product of EC and TC.  Increases (decreases) in productivity growth imply that a Malmquist 
index is greater (less) than one.  In a similar manner, values of EC and TC that are greater than 
one suggest improvements in EC and TC, whereas values less than one suggest deterioration in 
EC and TC.  
A nonparametric linear programming approach is used to calculate the values of the 
distance functions used to construct a productivity growth index.  Assume that there are 
1, ,i I= …  firms using 1, ,n N= …  inputs that produce 1, .m M= …  outputs.  Therefore, the 
individual firm’s input and output vectors associated with time t  can be represented as ,i tnx  and 
,i t
my , respectively. 
The base technology under constant returns to scale (CRS) at time t  is modeled using 
data as: 
 15
( ) , ,
1 1
,  such that , ,  0
I I
t t t t i i t i i t t i
m m n n
i i
F x y y z y z x x z
= =
⎧ ⎫= ≤ ≤ ≥⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑ ∑ ,   (11) 
where iz  is the intensity of use of the thi firm’s technology.  By adding the following convexity 
condition based on Afriat (1972), the constant returns to scale assumption can be modified to 
allow for variable returns to scale (VRS): 
1
1
I
i
i
z
=
=∑ .          (12) 
One may obtain technical efficiency change under constant returns to scale technology and then 
decompose it into two components–the pure efficiency component and the residual scale 
component.  The former is due to pure technical inefficiency and the latter is due to scale 
inefficiency.22  
In order to calculate a Malmquist index in (8), four different linear programming 
problems are used to solve for the values of four distance functions.  These are given by 
( ),t t tOD x y , ( )1 1,t t tOD x y+ + , ( )1 ,t t tOD x y+ ( )1 1 1, ,t t tOD x y+ + + .  For firm 'i , 
( )( ) 1', ', ',, maxt i t i t iO zD x y θ θ− =   
s. t. ' ', ,
1
I
i i t i i t
m m
i
y z yθ
=
≤∑      
, ',
1
I
i i t i t
n n
i
z x x
=
≤∑          (13) 
 0iz ≥ .         
                                                 
22 The decomposition can be expressed as: ( )1 1, , ,
,
t t t t
OM x y x y TEC H EFC H
TEC H PEFC H SC H
+ + = ×
= × ×
 
where TECH represents technological change, EFCH represents technical efficiency change, PEFCH represents 
pure efficiency change and SCH represents scale change.  EFCH is computed under CRS while PEFCH is computed 
under VRS.  
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and ( )( ) 11 ', 1 ', 1 ',, maxt i t i t iO zD x y θ θ−+ + + =   
s. t. ' ', 1 , 1 , 1
1
I
i i t i t i t
m m
i
y z yθ + + +
=
≤∑         (14) 
, 1 , 1 ', 1
1
I
i t i t i t
n n
i
z x x+ + +
=
≤∑  
 0iz ≥ .        
Two additional distance functions are required to calculate a Malmquist index for the two 
periods t  and 1t + . The first of these is calculated for firm 'i  as 
( )( ) 1', 1 ', 1 ',, maxt i t i t iO zD x y θ θ−+ + =  
s. t. ' ', 1 ,
1
I
i i t i i t
m m
i
y z yθ +
=
≤∑         (15) 
, ', 1
1
 
I
i i t i t
n n
i
z x x +
=
≤∑  
 0iz ≥ .         
Note that the value of θ  in (15) need not be greater than or equal to unity.  For example, the 
observation could lie above the feasible production possibility set since a production 
combination from period 1t +  is compared to technology in period t.  The last linear 
programming problem entails the same calculations as in (15) with transposed superscripts, t  
and 1t + , and stated as 
( )( ) 11 ', ', ',, maxt i t i t iO zD x y θ θ−+ =  
s. t. ' ', , 1
1
I
i i t i i t
m m
i
y z yθ +
=
≤∑         (16) 
, 1 ',
1
 
I
i i t i t
n n
i
z x x+
=
≤∑  
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 0iz ≥ .           
DATA 
This essay examines observations on the inputs and outputs of 25 ILECs over the period 1996-
2005 for which comparable data exist following the passage of the 1996 Act.  The data are 
obtained from the Electronic ARMIS Filing System maintained by the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and the Statistics of Communications Common Carriers.23 
Although both physical and financial data values are available as inputs or outputs, we separate 
the physical and financial data sets because the financial data are required to deflate variables 
and may result in measurement errors. 
Our input and output variable definitions use Majumdar’s (1997) approach, which defines 
3 outputs and 3 inputs.  The output variables are local calls, intraLATA toll calls and interLATA 
toll calls.24 Our measures of inputs are the number of total switches, the number of access lines 
and the number of employees.  The use of these three inputs is sufficient to capture the actual 
network characteristics of the firms that provide telephone service.  In the telecommunications 
industry, telephone switches comprise the system of electronic components that connect 
telephone calls, while actual messages are distributed by the physical (copper or fiber optic) lines.  
The summary statistics for the inputs and outputs for the ILECs examined in this essay 
over the period 1996-2005 are shown in Table 2.  It is noteworthy that the average of each of the 
outputs has been decreasing since 2000.  This reflects the fact that the ILECs lost significant 
market share to the CLECs following the implementation of the 1996 Act.  According to Trends 
                                                 
23 ARMIS stands for Automated Reporting Management Information System. This data set may accessed at 
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/armis.  FCC Report 43-02, the ARMIS USOA Report , FCC Report 43-07, the ARMIS 
Infrastructure Report and FCC Report 43-08, the ARMIS Operating Data  Report were used to construct the data set.  
24  InterLATA calls refers to calls that originate in one Local Access and Transport Area (LATA) and terminate in 
another LATA.  IntraLATA calls refers to calls that originate and terminate in the same LATA. LATAs are some 
times referred to as the service areas for the Bell Operating Companies.  See, for example, Newton (2000). 
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in Telephone Service (2007), the CLEC share of end-user switched access lines increased from 
4.3 percent in 1999 to 17.9 percent in 2005.   In addition, significant growth in the number of 
wireless subscribers and usage has caused the traditional wireline companies to experience 
significant erosion in their long distance telephone volumes.25  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Results for the efficiency scores and productivity growth indices are reviewed in this section.  In 
Table 3, we provide the technical efficiency scores for all merged and non-merged firms from 
1996 through 2005.  Note that a firm that lies on the production frontier has a value of one for its 
efficiency score for each year regardless of improvement or deterioration in its performance.  As 
a result, we are not able to examine the real efficiency change of the frontier firms over the 
sample period.  Despite this complexity, this approach does provide information as to how the 
efficiency measures for the non-frontier firms are changing over time.  When the efficiency score 
is closer to one, the efficiency of the non-frontier firm is catching up to that of the frontier firms.  
For example, in Table 3, a technical efficiency score for Qwest of 0.881 in 1996 indicates that 
Qwest could produce approximately 11.9 percent more output with the same level of inputs if it 
moved up on to the production frontier.  
In Table 4, we identify those firms that define the frontier technology for the first year 
(1996) and the final year (2005) adjacent to their observed combination of inputs and outputs.  In 
1996, 12 firms lie on the production frontier, while 11 firms lie on the production frontier in 
2005.  Table 4 indicates that Southwestern Bell, Nevada Bell, Michigan Bell, Verizon Virginia 
and Verizon Delaware were all on the production frontier in 1996, and yet all became non-
production frontier firms in 2005.  In addition, there are changes in the groups of peer firms over 
                                                 
25 The Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association (CTIA)’s survey data (2006) reveals a rapid increase 
in the number of wireless telephone subscribers, from 44,042,992 in 1996 to 207,896,198 in 2005, or an increase of 
372%.  
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the two periods.  For example, the peers for Qwest Corporation were Nevada Bell, BellSouth 
Corporation and Verizon New Jersey in 1996.  However, only Verizon New Jersey remained in 
the same peer group for Qwest Corporation in 2005.  Efficient firms on the frontier that do not 
appear as a peer for inefficient firms may be considered to be on the frontier as a result of their 
distinct characteristics in terms of input/output combinations.  For Example, Indiana Bell and 
Michigan Bell do not appear as a peer for any firm in 1996 while Verizon New Jersey appears as 
a peer for 12 firms. 
Table 5 provides the mean values of technical efficiency change, technological change 
and productivity growth change for the 25 ILECs over the period 1996 to 2005.26 The firms in 
the table are presented in descending order of the magnitude of their average productivity growth 
over the sample period.  Verizon South shows a 4.8 percent average growth in productivity, 
which is due to a 1.2 percent growth in technical efficiency change and a 3.6 percent growth in 
technological change.  It is useful to note the number of companies that improved their 
performance over the sample period.  Only 4 out of 25 companies, Verizon South, Verizon New 
York, Verizon Florida and Verizon Northwest, realized positive productivity growth over the 
sample period.  For example, Verizon South experienced a 4.8 percent annual growth in 
productivity over the sample period.  
Table 6 reports the average of technical efficiency change, technological change and 
productivity growth 3 years before and 3 years after the merger.  The sample companies are 
classified by 3 groups.  The first group includes firm 1 and firms 11 through 25 for mergers that 
occurred in 2000.  The second group includes firms 2 through 9 for mergers that occurred in 
                                                 
26 In this paper, the mean is the geometric mean. Let tM  denote the Malmquist index, where t stands for time and  t 
= 1, 2, . . . , 10.  The geometric mean is computed as 
10
10
1
.tt M=Π  
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1999.27  The last group contains only BellSouth Corporation as it is the only the non-merged 
firm in the sample.  The reason we examine the periods 3 years before and 3 years after the 
merger is to identify the merger effect for the same time interval.28 
Seven companies, comprised of firms 1, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 18 from the first group, 
and two companies, firms 3 and 4 from the second group, have experienced increases in 
productivity growth.  However, the control company, BellSouth Corporation, experienced 
decreased productivity growth.  Five companies, firms 3, 12, 15, 16, and 18, were able to reverse 
their performance from deterioration 3 years before the merger to improvement for 3 years after 
their merger.  For example, Pacific Bell-California experienced a 3.3 percent average growth in 
productivity for the 3 years after the merger, but a -4.7 percent average growth in productivity 
for the 3 years prior to the merger. 
Table 7 reports the mean of technical efficiency change, technological change, and 
productivity growth between the pre-merger and post-merger periods.  The mergers occurred in 
2000 and 1999 for the first and second groups, respectively.  Therefore, in order to compare 
every firm in each group with a non-merged firm, we compute two measures for BellSouth 
Corporation.  One measure is conducted from 2000 and the other measure is conducted from 
1999.  When comparing the measures in Table 6, the number of companies that experienced 
increased productivity growth decreased from 9 to 4.  This suggests that the merger effect of 
increased productivity growth diminishes over time.   
It is noteworthy that 3 companies, Verizon Virginia, Southwestern Bell and Michigan 
Bell, experienced lower average productivity growth after the merger than that of BellSouth 
                                                 
27 In fact, Pacific Telesis Group which has Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell operating companies first merged in 1997.  
Since our sample period begins with 1996 we place theses two companies in the second group. 
28 The maximum number of indexes before the merger for the second group is 3 (i.e., 1997, 1998, and 1999). The 
1997 index refers to the change between 1996 and 1997. Therefore, in order to compare the same period, we must 
use a 3-year data span before and after the merger. 
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Corporation.  The mean productivity growth for BellSouth Corporation was computed for two 
different time periods.  One is computed over 5 years and yields an annual growth rate of -5.2 
percent.  The other is computed over 6 years and yields an annual growth rate of -5.1 percent.  It 
should be noted that BellSouth Corporation, the only firm that was not part of a merger in our 
sample, is one of the worst performing ILECs in terms of average productivity growth.   
Conclusion 
The passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act ushered in a period of increased consolidation 
in the U.S. telecommunications industry.  Of the seven RBOCs created as a result of the AT&T 
divestiture, only 3 remain, Qwest, Verizon and AT&T (formerly SBC).  In order to examine the 
efficiencies associated with these mergers, this study attempts to measure the productivity 
growth associated with 25 ILECs over the period 1996-2005 using a Malmquist productivity 
index.  We also compute technical efficiency scores, which enable us to capture the relative 
efficiency effects and explain how the efficiency for the non-efficient firm is changing over time.  
The average efficiency scores for our sample companies have not changed significantly between 
1996 and 2005.  This implies that the average ILEC shows no measurable improvement in terms 
of optimizing their input-output combinations over time.  
The results of computing a Malmquist productivity index reveal that 9 out of 25 
individual firms are shown to have increased their average productivity growth for the 3-year 
period after the merger.  When we partition these firms into pre-merger and post-merger 
categories, the number of firms that increase productivity growth is reduced to 4 firms.  This 
suggests that the impact on average productivity growth resulting from the mergers decreases 
over time.  In addition, the measure of the Malmquist productivity index for the non-merged firm, 
BellSouth Corporation, is one of the lowest firms in the sample.  The index for BellSouth 
 22
Corporation shows about a -5 percent decline in annual productivity growth.  These results 
therefore provide some evidence of a positive merger effect, although this effect appears to 
diminish over time.  
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Figure 2.1 Output-Oriented DEA 
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Figure 2.2 Output Distance Function 
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Table 2.1 History of Mergers among RBOCs 
Year Name of RBOC Action Taken   
1996 NYNEX Acquired Bell Atlantic and branded Bell Atlantic 
1997 Pacific Telesis Group Acquired by SBC 
1999 Ameritech Acquired by SBC 
2000 Bell Atlantic Merged with GTE and formed Verizon 
2000 U S West Merged with Qwest 
2006 Verizon Acquired MCI 
2006 Southwestern Bell Corporation (SBC) Acquired AT&T and branded at&t  
2006 BellSouth Corporation Acquired by at&t 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics 
 Local call Intra  LATA  toll call 
inter  LATA  
toll call Total switches Access lines Employees 
1996 Mean       18,568,460             762,654         2,539,546                   596         5,644,720              15,254  
S.D.       22,134,968          1,045,108         2,368,059                   539         5,594,318              16,479  
Min            821,576                 4,902            236,733                     34            361,000                   842  
Max       94,344,715          4,929,318         9,427,603                1,782       22,017,000              59,486  
1997 Mean       19,203,861             745,459         2,737,357                   594         5,913,527              15,329  
S.D.       22,986,746          1,056,051         2,503,517                   536         5,887,640              16,114  
Min            961,244                 5,453              98,277                     33            326,212                   870  
Max       97,783,674          4,879,781       10,055,171                1,750       23,080,061              53,919  
1998 Mean       19,871,661             643,766         2,778,404                   591         6,131,493              15,466  
S.D.       23,378,880             977,498         2,385,641                   534         6,130,918              16,510  
Min         1,149,802                 4,906            105,215                     31            341,508                   870  
Max       99,324,801          4,807,358       10,695,077                1,770       23,908,672              56,188  
1999 Mean       20,267,909             613,354         3,014,317                   595         6,279,775              15,562  
S.D.       22,999,739             928,092         2,614,382                   537         6,258,412              17,178  
Min         1,227,627                 4,664              96,531                     31            363,444                   918  
Max       97,232,126          4,491,538       10,965,391                1,802       24,457,845              59,457  
2000 Mean       19,581,898             548,571         3,208,499                   574         6,271,283              15,594  
S.D.       22,223,409             875,148         2,665,776                   517         6,288,029              16,724  
Min         1,017,475                 4,728            110,000                     30            380,616                   921  
Max       93,784,438          4,396,675       11,102,561                1,715       24,558,289              61,555  
2001 Mean       18,642,513             542,199         3,005,960                   575         6,075,592              14,722  
S.D.       21,010,357          1,004,990         2,596,988                   516         6,057,136              15,947  
Min         1,022,195                 4,751            128,285                     30            367,578                   929  
Max       89,498,059          5,151,332       10,287,931                1,716       23,756,306              60,535  
2002 Mean       16,570,572             475,912         2,933,650                   561         5,808,766              12,728  
S.D.       18,727,360             997,724         2,723,152                   501         5,842,992              13,856  
Min            841,740                 4,419            182,374                     28            365,535                   774  
Max       82,925,856          5,120,259         9,379,825                1,722       22,954,773              53,461  
2003 Mean       15,096,699             415,611         2,675,848                   561         5,589,264              11,608  
S.D.       17,040,793             841,427         2,535,131                   500         5,576,337              13,085  
Min            780,677                 3,030            180,943                     30            361,218                   692  
Max       75,767,109          4,307,978         8,827,826                1,728       22,206,344              50,393  
2004 Mean       13,683,056             345,420         2,514,156                   561         5,327,325              11,300  
S.D.       15,247,549             674,329         2,314,766                   498         5,322,309              12,359  
Min            738,430                 2,191            179,010                     30            359,238                   659  
Max       67,393,286          3,426,898         8,328,607                1,722       21,316,936              47,678  
2005 Mean       12,106,135             311,944         2,357,347                   485         4,999,650              11,012  
S.D.       13,215,118             595,660         2,271,946                   482         5,019,158              12,017  
Min            659,198                 1,552            172,013                     30            351,471                   646  
Max       58,578,025          2,995,837         9,028,745                1,706       19,943,670              48,391  
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Table 2.3 Technical Efficiency Scores, 1996-2005 
Name 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Qwest Corporation 0.881 0.884 0.855 0.831 0.779 0.794 0.778 0.795 0.814 0.747
AT&T/Southwestern Bell Telephone  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.963 0.967 0.988 0.825
Pacific Bell - California  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Nevada Bell  1.000 0.730 0.803 0.852 0.742 0.727 0.752 0.760 0.776 0.824
Illinois Bell  0.896 0.870 0.906 0.901 0.908 0.893 0.832 0.860 0.922 0.917
Indiana Bell  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Michigan Bell  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.932 0.949 0.930 0.807
Ohio Bell  0.961 0.955 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.985 0.996 1.000 0.978
Wisconsin Bell  0.856 0.855 0.925 0.911 0.957 0.958 0.872 0.857 0.962 0.943
AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Verizon Washington D.C.  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Verizon Maryland  1.000 0.965 0.962 0.969 0.941 0.956 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Verizon Virginia  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.971 0.959 0.865 0.824
Verizon West Virginia  0.882 0.872 0.890 0.908 0.902 0.948 0.935 0.935 0.925 0.983
Verizon Delaware LLC  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.950
Verizon Pennsylvania  0.941 0.938 0.957 0.968 0.927 0.902 0.960 0.968 0.974 0.961
Verizon New Jersey  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Verizon New England  1.000 1.000 0.825 1.000 0.899 0.936 1.000 0.980 1.000 1.000
Verizon New York Telephone  0.722 0.675 0.655 0.945 0.955 0.987 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Verizon California  0.995 0.959 0.945 0.979 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Verizon Florida LLC  0.860 0.869 0.947 0.989 0.867 0.884 0.879 0.903 0.927 1.000
Verizon North, Inc.  0.862 0.860 0.851 0.859 0.941 0.902 0.791 0.829 0.835 0.825
Verizon Northwest, Inc.  0.843 0.893 1.000 1.000 0.837 0.877 0.864 0.889 0.836 0.882
Verizon South, Inc.  0.895 0.910 0.904 0.947 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
GTE of The Southwest, Inc.  
dba Verizon Southwest  0.971 0.987 0.966 1.000 1.000 0.987 0.979 0.991 0.990 0.910
Mean 0.943 0.929 0.936 0.962 0.946 0.950 0.940 0.945 0.950 0.935
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Table 2.4 Peers from DEA, 1996-2005 
Number Company Peers 
  1996 2005 
1 Qwest Corporation 17   10    4 21   20   24   17 
2 AT&T/Southwestern Bell Telephone  2 24   10 
3 Pacific Bell - California  3 3 
4 Nevada Bell  4 12   24   20 
5 Illinois Bell  17   11   10 21   10   24   17 
6 Indiana Bell  6 6 
7 Michigan Bell  7 21   20   24    3 
8 Ohio Bell  10   11   17   15   12 21   10   24   17 
9 Wisconsin Bell  10   12   15    3 20   12   24 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  10 10 
11 Verizon Washington D.C.  11 11 
12 Verizon Maryland  12 12 
13 Verizon Virginia  13 21   20   24   17 
14 Verizon West Virginia  17    4   10   13 24   20   12 
15 Verizon Delaware LLC  15 11    6   17   24 
16 Verizon Pennsylvania  15   12   17    3 24   17 
17 Verizon New Jersey  17 17 
18 Verizon New England  18 18 
19 Verizon New York Telephone  17   13   10 19 
20 Verizon California  18    3   17 20 
21 Verizon Florida LLC  10    4 21 
22 Verizon North, Inc.  17   10    4 18   24    3 
23 Verizon Northwest, Inc.  10   17    4 24   20   12 
24 Verizon South, Inc.  17    4   10 24 
25 GTE of The Southwest, Inc.  dba Verizon Southwest  17    4   10 18   24    3 
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Table 2.5 Mean Technical Efficiency Change, Technological Change and Productivity Change, 
1996-2005 
Firm # Firm Efficiency change Technological change Productivity change
24 Verizon South, Inc.  1.012 1.036 1.048 
19 Verizon New York Telephone  1.037 0.976 1.013 
21 Verizon Florida LLC  1.017 0.986 1.002 
23 Verizon Northwest, Inc.  1.005 0.996 1.001 
25 GTE of The Southwest, Inc.  dba Verizon Southwest 0.993 1.002 0.995 
14 Verizon West Virginia  1.012 0.983 0.995 
22 Verizon North, Inc.  0.995 0.998 0.993 
9 Wisconsin Bell  1.011 0.982 0.993 
6 Indiana Bell  1.000 0.989 0.989 
16 Verizon Pennsylvania  1.002 0.985 0.987 
20 Verizon California  1.001 0.984 0.985 
18 Verizon New England  1.000 0.985 0.984 
12 Verizon Maryland  1.000 0.983 0.983 
8 Ohio Bell  1.002 0.980 0.982 
15 Verizon Delaware LLC  0.994 0.987 0.982 
11 Verizon Washington D.C.  1.000 0.972 0.972 
5 Illinois Bell  1.003 0.968 0.971 
13 Verizon Virginia  0.979 0.989 0.968 
17 Verizon New Jersey  1.000 0.966 0.966 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  1.000 0.963 0.963 
1 Qwest Corporation 0.982 0.980 0.962 
7 Michigan Bell  0.976 0.982 0.958 
2 AT&T/Southwestern Bell Telephone 0.979 0.977 0.957 
3 Pacific Bell - California  1.000 0.956 0.956 
4 Nevada Bell  0.979 0.950 0.930 
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Table 2.6 Mean Technical Efficiency Change, Technological Change, and Productivity Growth 
Change, 3 Years Before and 3 Years after Merger 
3 years before merger 3 years after merger 
Firm # Firm 
Efficiency 
change 
Technological 
change 
Productivity 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Technological 
change 
Productivity 
change 
1 Qwest Corporation 0.959 0.994 0.954 1.006 0.958 0.964 
11 Verizon Washington D.C.  1.000 0.948 0.948 1.000 0.960 0.960 
12 Verizon Maryland  0.992 0.997 0.989 1.021 0.988 1.009 
13 Verizon Virginia  1.000 0.998 0.998 0.986 0.978 0.964 
14 Verizon West Virginia  1.011 0.996 1.007 1.012 0.997 1.009 
15 Verizon Delaware LLC  1.000 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.034 1.034 
16 Verizon Pennsylvania  0.996 0.991 0.987 1.014 1.010 1.025 
17 Verizon New Jersey  1.000 0.993 0.993 1.000 0.978 0.978 
18 Verizon New England  0.965 0.950 0.917 1.029 0.975 1.003 
19 Verizon New York Telephone  1.123 0.990 1.112 1.016 0.968 0.983 
20 Verizon California  1.014 1.007 1.021 1.000 0.993 0.993 
21 Verizon Florida LLC  1.000 1.005 1.005 1.014 0.941 0.954 
22 Verizon North, Inc.  1.031 1.032 1.064 0.958 0.974 0.933 
23 Verizon Northwest, Inc.  0.979 1.035 1.013 1.020 0.979 0.999 
24 Verizon South, Inc.  1.032 1.078 1.112 1.000 1.013 1.013 
25 GTE of The Southwest, Inc.  dba Verizon Southwest  1.004 1.055 1.060 0.997 0.943 0.940 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  1.000 0.966 0.966 1.000 0.961 0.961 
2 AT&T/Southwestern Bell Telephone  1.000 0.976 0.976 0.988 0.966 0.954 
3 Pacific Bell - California  1.000 0.953 0.953 1.000 1.033 1.033 
4 Nevada Bell  0.948 0.939 0.890 0.959 0.973 0.933 
5 Illinois Bell  1.002 1.011 1.013 0.974 0.958 0.933 
6 Indiana Bell  1.000 1.020 1.020 1.000 0.969 0.969 
7 Michigan Bell  1.000 1.005 1.005 0.977 0.959 0.936 
8 Ohio Bell  1.014 1.018 1.032 0.995 0.966 0.961 
9 Wisconsin Bell  1.021 1.006 1.026 0.986 0.982 0.968 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  1.000 0.990 0.990 1.000 0.966 0.966 
- Firm number 11 through 25 and 1 pertain to the first group.  Firm number 2 to 10 pertain to the second group.  The 
third group includes firm number 10. 
- Firm number 3 and 4  first merged in 1997.  Since our sample period begins with 1996 we place theses two firms in 
the second group. 
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Table 2.7 Mean Technical Efficiency Change, Technological Change, and Productivity Growth 
Change, Pre-merger and Post-merger 
Pre-Merger Post-Merger 
Firm # Firm 
Efficiency 
change 
Technological 
change 
Productivity 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Technological 
change 
Productivity 
change 
1 Qwest Corporation 0.970 0.997 0.967 0.991 0.966 0.958 
11 Verizon Washington D.C.  1.000 0.961 0.961 1.000 0.980 0.980 
12 Verizon Maryland  0.985 1.001 0.986 1.012 0.969 0.981 
13 Verizon Virginia  1.000 1.012 1.012 0.962 0.971 0.934 
14 Verizon West Virginia  1.006 1.002 1.008 1.017 0.968 0.985 
15 Verizon Delaware LLC  1.000 0.991 0.991 0.990 0.985 0.975 
16 Verizon Pennsylvania  0.996 0.992 0.988 1.007 0.980 0.987 
17 Verizon New Jersey  1.000 0.989 0.989 1.000 0.948 0.948 
18 Verizon New England  0.974 0.977 0.952 1.021 0.991 1.012 
19 Verizon New York Telephone  1.073 1.005 1.078 1.009 0.954 0.963 
20 Verizon California  1.001 1.003 1.004 1.000 0.969 0.969 
21 Verizon Florida LLC  1.002 1.015 1.018 1.029 0.962 0.990 
22 Verizon North, Inc.  1.023 1.027 1.051 0.974 0.975 0.950 
23 Verizon Northwest, Inc.  0.998 1.029 1.027 1.010 0.970 0.980 
24 Verizon South, Inc.  1.028 1.063 1.093 1.000 1.014 1.014 
25 GTE of The Southwest, Inc.  dba Verizon Southwest  1.007 1.047 1.054 0.981 0.969 0.950 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation 1.000 0.982 0.982 1.000 0.948 0.948 
2 AT&T/Southwestern Bell Telephone  1.000 0.976 0.976 0.968 0.978 0.947 
3 Pacific Bell - California  1.000 0.953 0.953 1.000 0.957 0.957 
4 Nevada Bell  0.948 0.939 0.890 0.994 0.955 0.950 
5 Illinois Bell  1.002 1.011 1.013 1.003 0.948 0.951 
6 Indiana Bell  1.000 1.020 1.020 1.000 0.974 0.974 
7 Michigan Bell  1.000 1.005 1.005 0.965 0.970 0.936 
8 Ohio Bell  1.014 1.018 1.032 0.996 0.961 0.958 
9 Wisconsin Bell  1.021 1.006 1.026 1.006 0.970 0.976 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  1.000 0.990 0.990 1.000 0.949 0.949 
- Firm number 11 through 25 and 1 pertain to the first group.  Firm number 2 to 10 pertain to the second group.  The 
third group includes firm number 10. 
- Firm number 3 and 4 first merged in 1997.  Since our sample period begins with 1996 we place theses two firms in 
the second group. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Market Consolidation and Productivity Growth in 
U.S. Telecommunications: Stochastic Frontier analysis vs. 
Malmquist index 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1996, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act) substantially amended the 
Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act)29.  The primary purpose of the 1996 Act was to 
stimulate competition in both local and long distance telecommunications markets. Incumbent 
Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) were required to open up local exchange telecommunications 
markets to competition by unbundling their networks and providing the component inputs, 
known as unbundled network elements (UNEs), to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) 
at prices set by state regulators.30  As the quid pro quo for such network sharing, the 1996 Act 
allowed the Regional Bell Operating Companies’ (RBOCs) to gain entry into the interLATA 
long distance market once they satisfied the so-called “Competitive Checklist contained in 
Section 271 of the Act.31, 32  
                                                 
29 The 1934 Act empowered Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate the telecommunications 
industry in the U.S. 
30 CLECs can lease the individual unbundled network elements and combine them with their own facilities to 
provide the retail telecommunications product. UNE-L, or the unbundled network loop, is example of this type of 
network element.  The UNE-L entails leasing the loop, which is the connection from the telephone exchange’s 
central office to the customer premises equipment.  UNE-P, or the unbundled network element platform, is a special 
type of resale in which the network inputs are combined for the entrant by the incumbent provider.  The price for 
UNE-P is lower than that of pure resale because it is based on TELRIC (total element long-run incremental cost) 
rather than avoided cost, but the two are functionally indistinguishable otherwise.  The Federal Communications 
Commission began phasing out UNE-P in 2005 because it came to believe that the availability of UNE-P was 
having an adverse effect on investment in network infrastructure.  See FCC (2005). 
31 At the time of the divestiture, 1984, there were seven RBOCs: Ameritech Corporation, Bell Atlantic Corporation, 
BellSouth Corporation, NYNEX Corporation, Pacific Telesis Group, Southwestern Bell Corporation and U.S. West, 
Inc.  
32 InterLATA long distance calls refers to calls that originate in one Local Access and Transport Area (LATA), cross  
over and terminate in another LATA.   IntraLATA long distance calls refers to calls that originate and terminate in 
the same LATA.  LATAs  are some times referred to as the  service areas for the Bell Operating Companies.  See 
Newton (2000). 
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One of the key trends in the telecommunications industry following the passage of the 
1996 Act was a series of business consolidations among ILECs that policy makers did not fully 
anticipate.33 Southwestern Bell Corporation (SBC, now at&t) was a leader in this trend.  SBC 
acquired Pacific Telesis Group, Southern New England Telephone and Ameritech in 1997, 1998 
and 1999, respectively. U.S. West merged with QWEST Communications in 1999.  A merger 
between Bell Atlantic and GTE formed Verizon in 2000.  In 2005, AT&T was acquired by SBC 
communications and branded at&t Inc.  In December 2006, at&t acquired BellSouth Corporation, 
which is the last of the RBOCs to have retained its original corporate name following the 1984 
AT&T divestiture.  
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) use the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG) to evaluate horizontal mergers.  The HMG take into 
account a number of factors including market concentration, entry barriers, and merger 
efficiencies.34 As long as competition remains vigorous following the merger, measured in terms 
of little or no discernible increase in market power, the merger is likely to be approved by the 
DOJ/FTC.  Nonetheless, from an operational standpoint, these prospective efficiency gains are 
difficult to verify and quantify. 
One of the methods that may be used to examine efficiencies is to measure productivity 
growth, inclusive of its underlying components--technological progress and changes in technical 
efficiency.  From a policy perspective, the decomposition of productivity growth into these 
components provides important information for analysis.  For example, if policymakers are able 
to determine the key drivers of productivity growth, they may adopt policies that can 
                                                 
33 Another important trend in the telecommunications industry is vertical integration.  See, for example, Weisman 
(2000). 
34 In order to measure efficiencies, the HMG introduced the “cognizable efficiency” concept which “are assessed net 
of costs produced by the merger or incurred in achieving those efficiencies.” See HMG (p. 31)  
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significantly improve the performance of firms and the overall economy.  Suppose, for example, 
that the lack of technological progress is the source of low productivity growth. It would then be 
possible to put in place various policies that stimulate technological innovation and move the 
technology frontier outwards over time.  If high rates of technological change associated with 
low rates of efficiency change are measured, then policy makers may focus on the policy that 
increases the efficiency of firms. 
To measure the production frontier, we use an output distance function approach 
introduced by Shepard (1970).  The main advantage of the distance function approach is that it 
allows for a multiple-input and multiple-output technology without requiring price data.  The 
distance function can be estimated in several ways.  These include data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), parametric deterministic linear programming (PLP), corrected ordinary least squares 
(COLS), and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). 
There are a number of empirical studies that measure productivity growth using SFA 
across different industries.35 Kim and Han (2001) measured productivity growth associated with 
technological change and efficiency changes in Korean manufacturing industries.  They found 
that technological change was the main factor contributing to productivity growth.  Coelli et al. 
(2003) employed SFA to investigate productivity growth in Bangladesh crop agriculture over the 
period 1961-1992. Using 16 regional data points, they found that productivity growth is affected 
by the green revolution and agricultural research expenditures.  Recently, Resende (2006) 
conducted an analysis that examined parametric and non-parametric efficiency measures 
resulting from the implementation of incentive regulation in the U.S. telecommunications 
industry.  He compared efficiency scores obtained from DEA, COLS, and SFA (with time-
                                                 
35 Uri (2002) employed a COLS approach to measure the efficiency gains associated with the implementation of 
incentive regulation in the U.S. telecommunications industry.  Using data from 19 LECs over the 1988-1999 time 
period,  Uri found no empirical evidence that incentive regulation had enhanced technical efficiency. 
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invariant and time-varying inefficiency effects). He found no significant consistency across the 
different methods. 
Despite a voluminous literature on productivity growth using SFA, the measurement of 
productivity growth associated with mergers has received surprisingly little attention. 
Specifically, in the telecommunications industry, no study to date has attempted to measure 
productivity growth and proceeded to decompose it into its component parts, technological 
change and efficiency change, using a stochastic frontier model.36  Therefore, this study provides 
productivity growth measures associated with the decomposition analysis, which differs from 
Resende (2006) who examines efficiency scores.  In addition, this study compares both the SFA 
approach and the Malmquist index approach for mergers in the U.S. telecommunications 
industry.37  
This study has two principal objectives.  The first objective is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of mergers that occurred between 1996 and 2005 using SFA. We investigate 
whether productivity growth has increased among ILECs that have merged since the 1996 Act 
and whether the merged firms performed better than those firms that did not merge.  The second 
objective is to compare productivity growth results between SFA and a Malmquist index 
approach.  This comparison provides useful information on the robustness of the efficiency 
findings across different approaches.     
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the multiple 
output distance function and presents the models used in the study.  In Section 3, we discuss the 
data.  The empirical results are presented and compared in Section 4.  Section 5 contains a brief 
summary and conclusion. 
                                                 
36 Seo and Weisman (2007) investigated the same issue with a non-parametric approach. 
37 There are number of empirical studies that compare parametric and non-parametric methods in various industries. 
See, for example, Aigner and Chu (1968), and Kopp and Smith (1980). 
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Methodology 
Distance Function 
In order to define the output distance function, we first introduce the production technology.  We 
assume that for each time period 1, , ,t T= …  the production technology tF maps input 
vectors, ntx +∈R , into output vectors, mty +∈R , 
 ( ){ }, :  can produce t t t t tF x y x y= ,       (1) 
whereR is the set of real numbers.38 The production technology tF  is homogeneous of degree 
one in output.  Following Shepard (1970), the output distance function is defined at time t  as: 
( ) ( ){ }( ) 1, inf : , sup : ,t ttOt t t t t tyD x y x F x y Fθ θ θθ −⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞= ∈ = ∈⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭ .   (2) 
According to Lovell et al. (1994), the output distance function ( ),Ot t tD x y  is non-
decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous39  and convex in y and decreasing in x .40 Note that 
input-output vectors lie below the production technology set.  This implies that ( ), 1Ot t tD x y ≤  if 
and only if ( ), tt tx y F∈ .  Moreover, ( ), 1Ot t tD x y =  if and only if input-output combinations lie on 
the boundary of the production technology set, which is illustrated in Figure 1.  The value of the 
                                                 
38 The production technology must satisfy the following axioms in order to be a meaningful model of production: i) 
the possibility of inaction. ii) monotonicity of the output correspondence iii) disposability of output iv) the output set 
is closed v) irreversibility (Färe, R., and S. Grosskopf. 1994). 
39 In Section 2.2, we assume homogeneity of degree one in y. 
40 One can define the input distance function as follows: 
 ( ), s u p : , .ttI t t t txD x y y Fδ δ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞= ∈⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
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distance function evaluated at ( ),t tx y  is 2
2
1oa
oa
= , whereas the value of the distance function 
evaluated at ( )' ',t tx y  is 1
2
1oa
oa
< .41  
Stochastic Frontier Model 
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) simultaneously published 
an analysis of the Stochastic Frontier Model (SFM) in different outlets.  Technical efficiency, as 
well as random shocks, is considered and specified in this model.  The main advantage of SFM is 
that it accounts for the possible influence of noise on the shape and positioning of the frontier, 
something that deterministic frontier models are unable to do.  In other words, issues such as 
measurement error and other random factors can be separated from the sources of variation in 
technical efficiency.  SFM posits a production function with an error term associated with two 
components.  These two components consist of a symmetric error term accounting for noise and 
an asymmetric error term accounting for technical inefficiency.  
In order to estimate the stochastic frontier, a distance function must be specified.  Based 
on Coelli and Perelman (2000), the multiple output distance function is specified in translog 
functional form and is given by42: 
0
1 1 1 1
1ln( ) ln ln ln ln
2
J L J J
Oi j ij l il jk ij ik
j l j k
D y x y yα α β α
= = = =
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑∑  
1 1 1 1
1 1ln ln ln ln ,            1, 2, ,
2 2
L L J L
lm il im jl ij il
l m j l
x x y x i Iβ δ
= = = =
+ + =∑∑ ∑∑ …    (3) 
where J  is the number of outputs, L is the number of inputs, and i denotes the i th firm in the 
sample.  The restrictions required for homogeneity of degree one in outputs are 
                                                 
41 Refer to Coelli et al. (1998) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for further discussion of distance functions. 
42 In this study, we use 3 outputs and 3 inputs. 
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1
1
J
j
j
α
=
=∑            (4) 
and 
 
1
0,    1, 2, ,
J
jk
k
j Jα
=
= = …∑  and 
1
0,         1, 2, ,
L
jl
l
l Lδ
=
= = …∑ .    (5) 
The restrictions required for symmetry are 
 ,         , 1, 2, ,jk kj j k Jα α= = …  and ,         , 1, 2, ,lm ml l m Lβ β= = … .   (6) 
Lovell et al. (1994) proposed a convenient method for imposing the homogeneity 
restriction in (3).  Homogeneity implies that  
( ) ( ), , ,O OD x y D x yλ λ=  for any 0λ > .      (7) 
Hence, we arbitrarily choose one of the outputs, the J th output, and normalize on it.  This, in 
turn, allows us to obtain 
 ( ),, OO
J J
D x yyD x
y y
⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.        (8) 
The translog function can be written as: 
1 1 1
* * *
0
1 1 1 1
1ln( ) ln ln ln ln
2ij
J L J J
oi
j l il jk ij ik
j l j kiJ
D y x y y
y
α α β α− − −
= = = =
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑∑     
 
1
*
1 1 1 1
1 1ln ln ln ln ,      1, 2, ,
2 2
L L J L
lm il im jl ij il
l m j l
x x y x i Iβ δ−
= = = =
+ + =∑∑ ∑∑ … ,   (9) 
where * ijij
iJ
y
y
y
= .43 Equation (9) can be rewritten in the following functional form  
( ) ( )*ln( ) , , , lniJ Oiy TL y x Dα β− = − 44      (10) 
                                                 
43 Note that the value of Jth output, ln iJ
iJ
y
y
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, is 0.  This implies that the summations involving outputs are 
comprised  of J-1 terms.  
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SFM has two error components that are comprised of a two-sided noise component and a 
non-negative technical inefficient component.  We append the noise term iv  and change the 
notation from ( )ln OiD  to iu− .  This transformation yields the stochastic frontier function 
associated with the time trend for panel data and is expressed as follows: 
1
* 2
0
1 1
1ln( ) ln ln
2
J L
it T j ijt l ilt TT
j l
Y t y x tα α α β α−
= =
− = + + + +∑ ∑  
1 1 2
* * *
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1ln ln ln ln ln
2 2 2
J J L L
jk ijt ikt lm ilt imt Tj ijt
j k l m j
y y x x t yα β α− −
= = = = =
+ + +∑∑ ∑∑ ∑   
1
*
1 1 1
1 1ln ln ln
2 2
L J L
Tl ilt jl ijt ilt it it
l j l
t x y x v uβ δ−
= = =
+ + + +∑ ∑∑ .45    (11) 
where 1,2, ,t T= …  is a time trend. itY  and *ijty  are the output and arbitrarily normalized output 
for firm i , respectively.  Subscripts ,j k  index outputs; , ,α β δ  are parameters to be estimated; x  
variables are inputs.  Subscripts ,l m  index inputs; the itv s are the error components and are 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed as ( )20, vN σ .  The itu ’s are the technical 
inefficiency components.     
Following Battese and Coelli (1992), the technical inefficiency error term is defined by 
 ( )exp ,         1, 2, , ; 1, 2, ,it iu u t T i I t Tη= − − = =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ … … ,    (12) 
where the iu s are assumed to be a non-negative truncation of the normal distribution ( )2,N μμ σ  
associated with technical inefficiency in production.46 iu  is the technical inefficiency effect for 
                                                                                                                                                             
44 Note that Doi = 1 implies that the boundary of the frontier. 
45 Note that as suggested by Morrison-Paul et al. (2000), one can change the sign of dependent variable.  This 
change allows for interpreting estimates that conform to the standard SFA framework. 
46 There are other distributional assumptions imposed on the inefficiency error term, such as half-normal, 
exponential, and gamma-halton.  See, for example, Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
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firm i  for the last period of the sample;47 η is an unknown parameter to be estimated and 
represents the rate of change in technical inefficiency.  Therefore, a positive value, 0η > , implies 
that the technical inefficiency effects are decreasing over time.48 One of the advantages of using 
the error term in (12) is that any technical inefficiency changes over time can be separated from 
technical change.  In this essay, the maximum likelihood estimates of the unknown parameters 
and the technical inefficiency, defined by (11) and (12), are obtained using the FRONTIER 4.1 
computer program.49  
Following Coelli et al. (1998) and given estimates for (11) and (12), the technical 
efficiencies of production for each firm in the t th year can be predicted as: 
( )expit itTE u= − .50         (13) 
Therefore, the technical efficiency change between periods t  and 1t −  is calculated as: 
 
1
it
it
it
TEEC
TE −
= .          (14) 
With the estimates of the parameters in (11) and (12), the index of the technological 
change for firm i  is calculated by evaluating the partial derivative of the production function 
with respect to time.  The calculation of technological change is computed according to: 
( ) ( )* * * * * *, , , , , , , ,
1 1is is it itit
f y x t f y x t
TC
s t
α β α β⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= + × +∂ ∂⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
.51   (15) 
                                                 
47 In the last period, T, the value of the exponential function is 1 which implies that iT iu u= . 
48 If η > 0 then –η(t – T)  ≡  –η(t – T) and it iu u> . However, the value of the exponential function is decreasing 
monotonically towards the value of the last period in the sample.  If η = 0, the translog specification in (11) becomes 
a time-invariant inefficiency model. 
49 See Coelli (1996a). 
50 The predicted values of technical efficiency lie between zero and one. The value of one implies that the firm lies 
on the boundary of the production possibility set.  
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Finally, the TFP index can be obtained by the product of the index of technical efficiency 
change and the index of technological change calculated from (14) and (15): 
it it itTFP EC TC= × .         (16) 
A Malmquist Index Approach 
A Malmquist index approach is a non-parametric method for measuring productivity growth that 
allows for a decomposition in terms of technological progress and efficiency change.  One of the 
important advantages of using this index is that no explicit functional form for the frontier is 
required since the DEA approach uses linear programming.  In addition, the DEA method does 
not require any price data.52  
Following Caves et al. (1982), a Malmquist index, which is computed as the ratio of two 
output distance functions, is constructed as: 
( )
( )
,
,
Ot t t
S
Os s s
D x y
M
D x y
= ,53         (17) 
where t  and s  are adjacent periods.  Färe et al. (1994) suggested using the output-based 
Malmquist index in order to avoid the use of an arbitrary benchmark: 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
, ,
, , ,
, ,
Os t t Ot t t
O t t s s
Os s s Ot s s
D x y D x y
M x y x y
D x y D x y
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
.     (18) 
In order to decompose a Malmquist index into technical efficiency change and 
technological change, (18) can be rearranged as: 
                                                                                                                                                             
51 Equation (15) differs from Nishimizu and Page (1982) in two respects.  First, the former uses a stochastic frontier 
approach to estimate the technology, while the latter uses deterministic model.  Second, the former uses a geometric 
mean whereas the latter uses an arithmetic mean. 
52 Although a distance production approach does not require price data for both parametric and non-parametric 
methods, revenue, cost, and profit approaches which employ parametric estimation do require price data.  
53 Technology in period t is treated as the base-case technology.  
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⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= × ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
,   (19) 
where ( )( )
,
,
Ot t t
Os s s
D x y
D x y
 measures whether the production technology is getting closer to or farther 
away from the production frontier between adjacent periods s  and t . 
( )
( )
( )
( )
, ,
, ,
Os t t Os s s
Ot t t Ot s s
D x y D x y
D x y D x y
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 measures the move of the technology frontier between the two 
periods evaluated at sx  and tx .  
Therefore, the technical efficiency change (EC) is expressed as: 
( )
( )
,
,
Ot t t
Os s s
D x y
EC
D x y
= ,         (20) 
and technological change is expressed as: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
, ,
, ,
Os t t Os s s
Ot t t Ot s s
D x y D x y
TC
D x y D x y
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
.       (21) 
A Malmquist index of one indicates that there is no change in inputs and outputs between 
adjacent periods s and t .  It should be noted, however, that, EC and TC are not necessarily equal 
to one because the Malmquist index is the product of EC and TC.  A value for the Malmquist 
index greater than one indicates that productivity growth is positive, whereas a Malmquist index 
value less than one implies that productivity growth is negative.  
In this study, linear programming is used to calculate values of the distance functions 
which, in turn, determine the productivity growth index.  The DEA procedures used here follow 
Färe et al. (1994).  In order to calculate a Malmquist index in (19), four different linear 
programming problems are used to solve for the values of four distance functions.  These 
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distance functions are given by ( ),Os s sD x y , ( ),Os t tD x y , ( ),Ot t tD x y  and ( ),Ot s sD x y .  The 
computations for the linear programming are carried out using the DEAP 2.1 computer 
program.54 
DATA 
The data used in this analysis represents a balanced panel that consists of annual data for 25 
ILECs over the 1996-2005 time period.  The sample period starts with 1996 because this essay 
focuses on mergers among ILECs following the 1996 Act.  The year 2005 is chosen as the 
ending period as it was necessary to exclude two merger cases where data were limited or 
unavailable.55  The primary sources of data are obtained from the Electronic ARMIS Filing 
System and the Statistics of Communications Common Carriers maintained by the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC).56 
Local calls, intraLATA toll calls and interLATA toll calls are the output variables since 
these are the core services provided by ILECs.  The measures of inputs are the number of total 
switches, the number of access lines, and the number of employees.57  The use of these three 
inputs captures the actual industry characteristic for providing telephone service.  In the 
telecommunications industry, telephone switches, represent the system of electronic components 
that connect telephone calls, while actual messages are distributed by the telephone lines, 
sometimes referred to as local loops.  
                                                 
54 See Coelli (1996b). 
55 Those two mergers occurred in December 2005 and 2006. 
56 ARMIS is the acronym for Automated Reporting Management Information System.  One may refer to 
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/armis to access the data set.  FCC Report 43-02, the ARMIS USOA Report, FCC Report 
43-07, the ARMIS Infrastructure Report and FCC Report 43-08, the ARMIS Operating Data Report were used to 
populate the data set.  
57 Majumdar (1997) also introduced the same classification for outputs and inputs. 
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We use a stochastic frontier model with homogeneity imposed on (9).  IntraLATA toll 
calls are chosen as the output measure used to normalize all other outputs.  We, therefore, 
specify the variables used in (11) as follows:  
Y  is intraLATA toll calls; 
*
1y  is local calls divided by intraLATA toll calls; 
*
2y  is interLATA toll calls divided by intraLATA calls; 
1x  is number of switches; 
2x  is number of access lines; 
            and 3x  is number of employees. 
The summary statistics for the inputs and outputs for the ILECs from 1996-2005 are 
presented in Table 1.  It should be noted that the average of each of the outputs has been 
decreasing since 2000.  This is plausible because competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) 
have continued to encroach on the ILECs’ local telephone service markets following the 
implementation of the 1996 Act.  According to Trends in Telephone Service (2007) published by 
FCC, the CLEC share of end-user switched access lines are 4.3 percent and 17.9 percent in 1999 
and 2005, respectively.  In addition, significant growth in the number of wireless subscribers and 
associated usage has caused the traditional wireline companies to experience pronounced 
reductions in their long distance telephone volumes.58  
                                                 
58 Based on Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association (CTIA)’s survey data (2006), there is clear 
evidence of a rapid increase in the number of wireless telephone subscribers.  In fact, the number of wireless 
subscribers has increased by 372% (i.e., from 44,042,992 subscribers to 207,896,198 subscribers) from 1996 to 2005.  
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The test results for various null hypotheses presented in Table 2 are conducted using log-
likelihood ratio (LR) tests.  The LR test statistic is calculated by ( ) ( )02 AL H L H− × −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , where 
( )0L H  and ( )AL H  are the log-likelihood values under the null and alternative hypotheses, 
respectively.  Given the stochastic frontier specification, we first test for changes in technical 
inefficiency.  The null hypothesis ( )0γ μ η= = =  is rejected at the 1% significance level.  This 
implies technical inefficiency effects are statistically significant.  The second null hypothesis, 
that there is no technological change, is strongly rejected at the 1% significance level.  This 
result suggests that technological change exists in the model.  The third hypothesis, testing that 
technical inefficiency effects have a half-normal distribution is not rejected, indicating that the 
technical inefficiency effects can be represented by a half normal distribution.  The last set of 
hypothesis tests focuses on whether technical inefficiency is time-invariant.  This hypothesis is 
rejected at the 1% statistical significance level, implying that technical inefficiency varies over 
time.  In addition, the estimate of η  is statistically significant.  
The maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the parameters in the translog stochastic 
frontier production function defined by (11) and (12) are presented in Table 3.  Note that the 
parameter γ
2
2 2
μ
μ ν
σγ σ σ
⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 is the ratio of the error variances from (11).  Therefore, the value of 
γ  must lie between zero and one.  If 0γ = , no technical inefficiency is present, while 1γ =  
indicates that there exists no random noise.  Thus, our estimate of γ  = 0.872 implies that the 
technical inefficiency component dominates the random noise component.  The significant and 
positive estimate of the time varying inefficiency effect, 0.0964η = , indicates that the technical 
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inefficiency effects are decreasing  monotonically over time.  These results further substantiate 
the claim that there are time variant technical inefficiency effects in the error term that are 
decreasing over time.  
The indices for average productivity growth, efficiency, and technological change for the 
period 1996-2005 are shown in table 4.  The average efficiency change for all firms is greater 
than one.  The estimates of the inefficiency error term indicate that technical efficiency has 
occurred at a positive rate while the rate of growth decreased continuously during the sample 
period.  However, indices of average productivity growth for each firm indicate negative growth 
in productivity.  For example, Qwest Corporation exhibits a -3.5 percent growth in annual 
productivity.  It is noteworthy that BellSouth (firm 10), the only firm that has not merged in the 
sample, experienced the second lowest average productivity growth.  
Table 5 provides technological change estimates for each firm across each time period.  
Only three companies, Qwest Corporation, Southwestern Bell, and BellSouth have shown 
persistent declines in technological change.  All of the indices of technological change are less 
than one indicating technological regression over time.  One way of interpreting technological 
regression in this study is that it may be the result of structural changes in the 
telecommunications industry.  Production in the conventional sectors, which is our main focus, 
reveals no improvement, while the shift into new business models associated with new products 
such as satellite TV, broadband, and voice over internet protocol (VoIP) that require high 
technology grows rapidly.59  
Table 6 presents the average productivity, efficiency, and technological change for each 
individual firm during the pre-merger and post-merger periods.  The duration of the post-merger 
                                                 
59 See Neuchterlein and Weiser (2005) for a comprehensive analysis of the technological dynamics of the 
telecommunications industry and its economic implications.   
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period is 5 and 6 years for the first and second group, respectively.  Therefore, in order to 
compare every firm in each group with a firm that has not merged, we compute two measures for 
BellSouth Corporation.  One is calculated from 2000 and the other is calculated from 1999.  
When examining the indices in Table 6, it is noteworthy that every company experienced a 
decline in every index after a merger.  Specifically, BellSouth experienced a -5.2 percent annual 
growth in productivity after the merger.  Only firms 11 and 20 experience lower annual growth 
in productivity than that of BellSouth during the post-merger periods.     
We examine the robustness of these results by comparing the SFA and the Malmquist 
index.  These results are presented in Table 7 and Table 8.  Table 7 compares the mean 
efficiency change and the mean technological change between the SFM and the Malmquist index 
method during the pre-merger and post-merger periods.  There is a common trend in indices of 
mean technological change.  Using the Malmquist index method, only Verizon South has shown 
positive (1.4 percent per year) growth in technological change after the merger.  Otherwise, both 
methods indicate negative growth in technological change over the post-merger period.  There 
are some inconsistent results for the mean efficiency change between the two methods.  Using 
the SFM, each firm experiences positive growth in annual efficiency change over the post-
merger period.  However, the Malmquist index method indicates that 9 out of 25 individual firms 
exhibit negative growth in annual efficiency change.  The differences between two methods are 
likely attributable to the particular specification of the inefficiency error term in SFM. 
In Table 8, the Malmquist index method indicates that 4 out of 25 individual firms have 
experienced increases in average productivity growth.  In contrast, the stochastic frontier 
estimation approach indicates that every firm has experienced decreases in average productivity 
growth after the merger.  Only firms 18 and 24 measured by the Malmquist index method exhibit 
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a 1.2 percent and 1.4 percent average growth in productivity, respectively.  The remainder of the 
firms has experienced negative growth in productivity.  These results imply that most of the 
firms experience deterioration in productivity following their mergers.  Another interesting result 
concerns the number of companies that experience productivity performance worse than 
BellSouth, which is a non-merged control company.  In terms of productivity growth, only 2 
companies perform worse than BellSouth using the SFM approach, while 3 companies perform 
worse than BellSouth using the Malmquist index.   
CONCLUSION 
This study analyzes the merger effects for 25 ILECs over the period 1996-2005 using stochastic 
frontier analysis with a time varying inefficiency model.  We find that our sample has 
experienced deterioration in average productivity growth following the merger.  This empirical 
finding is attributed to technological regression, a finding that may lead policymakers to consider 
implementing policies that serve to shift out the production frontier over time.  In terms of 
average growth in productivity, the performance of BellSouth, the only firm in the sample not to 
have merged, ranks third lowest among the 25 ILECs.  
Another component of this study is a comparison of indices for the stochastic frontier 
analysis and the Malmquist index method.  This comparison provides useful information on 
robustness.  With the exception of one firm using the Malmquist index method, both methods 
indicate that every firm in the sample has experienced negative annual growth in technological 
change.  Indices of productivity growth suggest that most of the firms experience negative 
growth in annual productivity after the merger according to both methods.  However, in terms of 
productivity growth, it is noteworthy that the only firm not to have merged underperforms during 
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post-merger periods.  In SFM, annual productivity growth for BellSouth is the third lowest 
company in the sample and the fourth lowest using the Malmquist index method. 
In the telecommunications industry, the traditional wireline telecommunications sector 
has experienced a shift toward a new business model involving satellite TV, Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) and broadband internet.  This study is not able to fully examine the far-reaching 
effects of these phenomena.  Hence, further research is necessary to investigate the impact of 
these structural changes on the performance of the U.S telecommunications industry.  
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
 Local call intraLATA  toll call 
InterLATA  
toll call Total switches Access lines Employees 
1996 Mean       18,568,460             762,654         2,539,546                   596         5,644,720               15,254 
S.D.       22,134,968          1,045,108         2,368,059                   539         5,594,318               16,479 
Min            821,576                 4,902            236,733                     34            361,000                    842 
Max       94,344,715          4,929,318         9,427,603                1,782       22,017,000               59,486 
1997 Mean       19,203,861             745,459         2,737,357                   594         5,913,527               15,329 
S.D.       22,986,746          1,056,051         2,503,517                   536         5,887,640               16,114 
Min            961,244                 5,453              98,277                     33            326,212                    870 
Max       97,783,674          4,879,781       10,055,171                1,750       23,080,061               53,919 
1998 Mean       19,871,661             643,766         2,778,404                   591         6,131,493               15,466 
S.D.       23,378,880             977,498         2,385,641                   534         6,130,918               16,510 
Min         1,149,802                 4,906            105,215                     31            341,508                    870 
Max       99,324,801          4,807,358       10,695,077                1,770       23,908,672               56,188 
1999 Mean       20,267,909             613,354         3,014,317                   595         6,279,775               15,562 
S.D.       22,999,739             928,092         2,614,382                   537         6,258,412               17,178 
Min         1,227,627                 4,664              96,531                     31            363,444                    918 
Max       97,232,126          4,491,538       10,965,391                1,802       24,457,845               59,457 
2000 Mean       19,581,898             548,571         3,208,499                   574         6,271,283               15,594 
S.D.       22,223,409             875,148         2,665,776                   517         6,288,029               16,724 
Min         1,017,475                 4,728            110,000                     30            380,616                    921 
Max       93,784,438          4,396,675       11,102,561                1,715       24,558,289               61,555 
2001 Mean       18,642,513             542,199         3,005,960                   575         6,075,592               14,722 
S.D.       21,010,357          1,004,990         2,596,988                   516         6,057,136               15,947 
Min         1,022,195                 4,751            128,285                     30            367,578                    929 
Max       89,498,059          5,151,332       10,287,931                1,716       23,756,306               60,535 
2002 Mean       16,570,572             475,912         2,933,650                   561         5,808,766               12,728 
S.D.       18,727,360             997,724         2,723,152                   501         5,842,992               13,856 
Min            841,740                 4,419            182,374                     28            365,535                    774 
Max       82,925,856          5,120,259         9,379,825                1,722       22,954,773               53,461 
2003 Mean       15,096,699             415,611         2,675,848                   561         5,589,264               11,608 
S.D.       17,040,793             841,427         2,535,131                   500         5,576,337               13,085 
Min            780,677                 3,030            180,943                     30            361,218                    692 
Max       75,767,109          4,307,978         8,827,826                1,728       22,206,344               50,393 
2004 Mean       13,683,056             345,420         2,514,156                   561         5,327,325               11,300 
S.D.       15,247,549             674,329         2,314,766                   498         5,322,309               12,359 
Min            738,430                 2,191            179,010                     30            359,238                    659 
Max       67,393,286          3,426,898         8,328,607                1,722       21,316,936               47,678 
2005 Mean       12,106,135             311,944         2,357,347                   485         4,999,650               11,012 
S.D.       13,215,118             595,660         2,271,946                   482         5,019,158               12,017 
Min            659,198                 1,552            172,013                     30            351,471                    646 
Max       58,578,025          2,995,837         9,028,745                1,706       19,943,670               48,391 
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Table 3.2 LR Tests of hypotheses for parameters of stochastic production frontier model 
No Null Hypothesis Test statistics Critical value Decision 
(1) 0γ μ η= = =  146.629 10.501* Reject 0H  
(2) 1 2 1 2 3 0T TT T T T T Tα α α α β β β= = = = = = =  92.333 27,0.01 18.475χ =  Reject 0H  
(3) 0μ =  0.042 21,0.05 3.84χ =  Accept 0H  
(4) 0η =  11.998 21,0.01 6.63χ =  Reject 0H  
* The critical values for this test are obtained from Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986) for mixed 2,0.01vχ . 
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Table 3.3 Estimated parameters for stochastic production frontier model 
 
 
Log-likelihood = 342.4692                    
 Number of observations = 250   
Number of firms = 25 
Number of years = 10   
Parameters Coefficient Standard error 
0α  21.7045*** 7.5514 
Tα  0.2024*** 0.0696 
1α  1.5716** 0.7308 
2α  -1.5097** 0.7591 
1β  -0.4881 0.5813 
2β  5.2046*** 1.7148 
3β  -2.5032* 1.4291 
TTα  -0.0001 0.0008 
11α  0.0113 0.0605 
22α  0.0994 0.0816 
12α  -0.0773 0.0665 
11β  -0.1032*** 0.0370 
22β  -0.3456* 0.2073 
33β  0.0937 0.2060 
12β  0.1057 0.0747 
13β  -0.1030* 0.0626 
23β  0.1290 0.1928 
1Tα  -0.0320* 0.0164 
2Tα  0.0490*** 0.0180 
1Tβ  -0.0038 0.0081 
2Tβ  0.0624*** 0.0195 
3Tβ  -0.0452** 0.0208 
11δ  0.3297*** 0.0745 
12δ  -0.5105** 0.2141 
13δ  0.1479 0.2131 
21δ  -0.2331** 0.0909 
22δ  0.2730 0.2291 
23δ  0.0330 0.2314 μ  - - η  0.0964*** 0.0163 
2 2 2/( )μ μ νγ σ σ σ= +  0.8719 0.0536 
( )2 2 2μ νσ σ σ= +  0.0183 0.0073 
Note: *** = significant at 1% level (p<0.01). 
          ** = significant at 5% level (p<0.05). 
* = significant at 10% level (p<0.10). 
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Table 3.4 Mean Technical Efficiency change, Technological change and Productivity change for 
SFM, 1996-2005 
Firm # Firm Technological change Efficiency change Productivity change
1 Qwest Corporation 0.944 1.022 0.965 
2 AT&T/Southwestern Bell Telephone 0.960 1.013 0.973 
3 Pacific Bell - California  0.960 1.012 0.971 
4 Nevada Bell  0.968 1.016 0.984 
5 Illinois Bell  0.943 1.030 0.972 
6 Indiana Bell  0.956 1.011 0.966 
7 Michigan Bell  0.962 1.012 0.974 
8 Ohio Bell  0.952 1.012 0.963 
9 Wisconsin Bell  0.956 1.023 0.977 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  0.950 1.001 0.951 
11 Verizon Washington D.C.  0.939 1.002 0.941 
12 Verizon Maryland  0.941 1.019 0.960 
13 Verizon Virginia  0.940 1.019 0.958 
14 Verizon West Virginia  0.960 1.015 0.974 
15 Verizon Delaware LLC  0.960 1.004 0.963 
16 Verizon Pennsylvania  0.951 1.017 0.967 
17 Verizon New Jersey  0.943 1.028 0.969 
18 Verizon New England  0.950 1.024 0.973 
19 Verizon New York Telephone  0.939 1.056 0.992 
20 Verizon California  0.952 1.005 0.958 
21 Verizon Florida LLC  0.951 1.029 0.978 
22 Verizon North, Inc.  0.958 1.002 0.960 
23 Verizon Northwest, Inc.  0.961 1.010 0.971 
24 Verizon South, Inc.  0.961 1.002 0.963 
25 GTE of The Southwest, Inc.  dba Verizon Southwest  0.966 1.003 0.969 
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Table 3.5 Technological Change for SFM, 1996-2005 
Firm 1997* 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Qwest Corporation 0.959 0.955 0.952 0.947 0.942 0.939 0.938 0.936 0.932 
AT&T/Southwestern Bell Telephone  0.977 0.977 0.976 0.973 0.966 0.955 0.945 0.939 0.937 
Pacific Bell - California  0.962 0.967 0.971 0.966 0.963 0.957 0.952 0.951 0.949 
Nevada Bell  0.975 0.990 0.989 0.988 0.978 0.961 0.949 0.945 0.940 
Illinois Bell  0.951 0.943 0.939 0.940 0.947 0.948 0.943 0.941 0.936 
Indiana Bell  0.964 0.959 0.956 0.956 0.958 0.957 0.955 0.951 0.944 
Michigan Bell  0.970 0.965 0.959 0.956 0.961 0.965 0.965 0.962 0.958 
Ohio Bell  0.959 0.954 0.951 0.950 0.955 0.954 0.950 0.948 0.945 
Wisconsin Bell  0.963 0.957 0.953 0.952 0.957 0.959 0.958 0.953 0.947 
AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  0.957 0.954 0.951 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.948 0.945 0.942 
Verizon Washington D.C.  0.946 0.944 0.941 0.941 0.942 0.941 0.936 0.932 0.930 
Verizon Maryland  0.950 0.947 0.945 0.944 0.942 0.938 0.936 0.936 0.937 
Verizon Virginia  0.946 0.940 0.938 0.939 0.939 0.937 0.937 0.941 0.944 
Verizon West Virginia  0.973 0.969 0.966 0.963 0.959 0.955 0.952 0.952 0.953 
Verizon Delaware LLC  0.969 0.965 0.961 0.960 0.959 0.957 0.956 0.955 0.959 
Verizon Pennsylvania  0.957 0.952 0.950 0.950 0.951 0.950 0.949 0.950 0.951 
Verizon New Jersey  0.953 0.948 0.944 0.943 0.940 0.938 0.937 0.939 0.943 
Verizon New England  0.964 0.964 0.960 0.954 0.949 0.944 0.939 0.940 0.940 
Verizon New York Telephone  0.951 0.951 0.946 0.941 0.939 0.933 0.928 0.929 0.933 
Verizon California  0.970 0.967 0.964 0.956 0.950 0.946 0.941 0.937 0.941 
Verizon Florida LLC  0.962 0.959 0.956 0.951 0.947 0.945 0.945 0.946 0.949 
Verizon North, Inc.  0.970 0.965 0.962 0.957 0.951 0.954 0.953 0.951 0.956 
Verizon Northwest, Inc.  0.972 0.967 0.965 0.963 0.958 0.958 0.956 0.955 0.956 
Verizon South, Inc.  0.969 0.965 0.960 0.958 0.958 0.960 0.960 0.959 0.959 
GTE of The Southwest, Inc.  
dba Verizon Southwest  0.972 0.971 0.967 0.962 0.960 0.962 0.963 0.966 0.972 
* 1997 implies technological change between period 1996-1997. 
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Table 3.6 Mean Technical Efficiency Change, Technological Change, and Productivity Growth 
Change for SFM, Pre-merger and Post-merger 
Pre-Merger Post-Merger 
Firm # Firm 
Technological 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Productivity 
change 
Technological 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Productivity 
change 
1 Qwest Corporation 0.953 1.028 0.979 0.938 1.018 0.954 
11 Verizon Washington D.C.  0.943 1.002 0.945 0.936 1.001 0.937 
12 Verizon Maryland  0.946 1.024 0.969 0.937 1.015 0.952 
13 Verizon Virginia  0.941 1.024 0.964 0.940 1.016 0.954 
14 Verizon West Virginia  0.968 1.018 0.985 0.954 1.012 0.966 
15 Verizon Delaware LLC  0.964 1.004 0.968 0.957 1.003 0.960 
16 Verizon Pennsylvania  0.952 1.021 0.972 0.950 1.014 0.963 
17 Verizon New Jersey  0.947 1.035 0.980 0.939 1.022 0.960 
18 Verizon New England  0.961 1.030 0.989 0.942 1.019 0.960 
19 Verizon New York Telephone  0.947 1.070 1.014 0.932 1.045 0.974 
20 Verizon California  0.964 1.007 0.971 0.943 1.004 0.947 
21 Verizon Florida LLC  0.957 1.036 0.991 0.946 1.023 0.968 
22 Verizon North, Inc.  0.963 1.003 0.966 0.953 1.002 0.955 
23 Verizon Northwest, Inc.  0.967 1.013 0.979 0.956 1.008 0.964 
24 Verizon South, Inc.  0.963 1.003 0.965 0.959 1.002 0.961 
25 GTE of The Southwest, Inc.  dba Verizon Southwest  0.968 1.004 0.972 0.965 1.002 0.967 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  0.953 1.002 0.954 0.947 1.001 0.948 
2 AT&T/Southwestern Bell Telephone  0.976 1.017 0.993 0.953 1.011 0.963 
3 Pacific Bell – California*  0.966 1.015 0.981 0.956 1.010 0.966 
4 Nevada Bell * 0.985 1.021 1.005 0.960 1.014 0.973 
5 Illinois Bell  0.944 1.039 0.982 0.943 1.026 0.967 
6 Indiana Bell  0.960 1.014 0.973 0.953 1.009 0.962 
7 Michigan Bell  0.965 1.016 0.980 0.961 1.011 0.971 
8 Ohio Bell  0.955 1.016 0.970 0.950 1.010 0.960 
9 Wisconsin Bell  0.958 1.030 0.986 0.954 1.019 0.973 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  0.954 1.002 0.956 0.947 1.001 0.948 
* Firm number 3 and 4 first merged in 1997.  Since our sample period begins with 1996 we place theses two firms in 
the second group. 
- Firm number 11 through 25 and 1 pertain to the first group. Firm number 2 to 10 pertain to the second group.  The 
third group contains firm number 10. 
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Table 3.7 Mean Efficiency Change and Technological Change between Stochastic Frontier 
Model and Malmquist Index, Pre-merger and Post-merger 
Technological Change Efficiency Change 
SFM Malmquist SFM Malmquist Firm # Firm 
Pre-
Merger
Post-
Merger
Pre-
Merger
Post-
Merger
Pre-
Merger
Post-
Merger 
Pre-
Merger 
Post-
Merger
1 Qwest Corporation 0.953 0.938 0.997 0.966 1.028 1.018 0.970 0.991 
11 Verizon Washington D.C.  0.943 0.936 0.961 0.980 1.002 1.001 1.000 1.000 
12 Verizon Maryland  0.946 0.937 1.001 0.969 1.024 1.015 0.985 1.012 
13 Verizon Virginia  0.941 0.940 1.012 0.971 1.024 1.016 1.000 0.962 
14 Verizon West Virginia  0.968 0.954 1.002 0.968 1.018 1.012 1.006 1.017 
15 Verizon Delaware LLC  0.964 0.957 0.991 0.985 1.004 1.003 1.000 0.990 
16 Verizon Pennsylvania  0.952 0.950 0.992 0.980 1.021 1.014 0.996 1.007 
17 Verizon New Jersey  0.947 0.939 0.989 0.948 1.035 1.022 1.000 1.000 
18 Verizon New England  0.961 0.942 0.977 0.991 1.030 1.019 0.974 1.021 
19 Verizon New York Telephone  0.947 0.932 1.005 0.954 1.070 1.045 1.073 1.009 
20 Verizon California  0.964 0.943 1.003 0.969 1.007 1.004 1.001 1.000 
21 Verizon Florida LLC  0.957 0.946 1.015 0.962 1.036 1.023 1.002 1.029 
22 Verizon North, Inc.  0.963 0.953 1.027 0.975 1.003 1.002 1.023 0.974 
23 Verizon Northwest, Inc.  0.967 0.956 1.029 0.970 1.013 1.008 0.998 1.010 
24 Verizon South, Inc.  0.963 0.959 1.063 1.014 1.003 1.002 1.028 1.000 
25 GTE of The Southwest, Inc.  dba Verizon Southwest  0.968 0.965 1.047 0.969 1.004 1.002 1.007 0.981 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation 0.953 0.947 0.982 0.948 1.002 1.001 1.000 1.000 
2 AT&T/Southwestern Bell Telephone  0.976 0.953 0.976 0.978 1.017 1.011 1.000 0.968 
3 Pacific Bell - California * 0.966 0.956 0.953 0.957 1.015 1.010 1.000 1.000 
4 Nevada Bell * 0.985 0.960 0.939 0.955 1.021 1.014 0.948 0.994 
5 Illinois Bell  0.944 0.943 1.011 0.948 1.039 1.026 1.002 1.003 
6 Indiana Bell  0.960 0.953 1.020 0.974 1.014 1.009 1.000 1.000 
7 Michigan Bell  0.965 0.961 1.005 0.970 1.016 1.011 1.000 0.965 
8 Ohio Bell  0.955 0.950 1.018 0.961 1.016 1.010 1.014 0.996 
9 Wisconsin Bell  0.958 0.954 1.006 0.970 1.030 1.019 1.021 1.006 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  0.954 0.947 0.990 0.949 1.002 1.001 1.000 1.000 
* Firm number 3 and 4 first merged in 1997.  Since our sample period begins with 1996 we place theses two firms in 
the second group. 
- Firm number 11 through 25 and 1 pertain to the first group. Firm number 2 to 10 pertain to the second group.  The 
third group contains firm number 10. 
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Table 3.8 Comparison of Mean Productivity Growth Change between Stochastic Frontier Model 
and Malmquist Index, Pre-merger and Post-merger 
Stochastic Frontier Model Malmquist Index 
Firm # Firm 
Pre-Merger Post-Merger Pre-Merger Post-Merger 
1 Qwest Corporation 0.979 0.954 0.967 0.958 
11 Verizon Washington D.C.  0.945 0.937 0.961 0.980 
12 Verizon Maryland  0.969 0.952 0.986 0.981 
13 Verizon Virginia  0.964 0.954 1.012 0.934 
14 Verizon West Virginia  0.985 0.966 1.008 0.985 
15 Verizon Delaware LLC  0.968 0.960 0.991 0.975 
16 Verizon Pennsylvania  0.972 0.963 0.988 0.987 
17 Verizon New Jersey  0.980 0.960 0.989 0.948 
18 Verizon New England  0.989 0.960 0.952 1.012 
19 Verizon New York Telephone  1.014 0.974 1.078 0.963 
20 Verizon California  0.971 0.947 1.004 0.969 
21 Verizon Florida LLC  0.991 0.968 1.018 0.990 
22 Verizon North, Inc.  0.966 0.955 1.051 0.950 
23 Verizon Northwest, Inc.  0.979 0.964 1.027 0.980 
24 Verizon South, Inc.  0.965 0.961 1.093 1.014 
25 GTE of The Southwest, Inc.  dba Verizon Southwest  0.972 0.967 1.054 0.950 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation 0.954 0.948 0.982 0.948 
2 AT&T/Southwestern Bell Telephone  0.993 0.963 0.976 0.947 
3 Pacific Bell - California * 0.981 0.966 0.953 0.957 
4 Nevada Bell * 1.005 0.973 0.890 0.950 
5 Illinois Bell  0.982 0.967 1.013 0.951 
6 Indiana Bell  0.973 0.962 1.020 0.974 
7 Michigan Bell  0.980 0.971 1.005 0.936 
8 Ohio Bell  0.970 0.960 1.032 0.958 
9 Wisconsin Bell  0.986 0.973 1.026 0.976 
10 AT&T/BellSouth Corporation  0.956 0.948 0.990 0.949 
* Firm number 3 and 4 first merged in 1997.  Since our sample period begins with 1996 we place theses two firms in 
the second group. 
- Firm number 11 through 25 and 1 pertain to the first group. Firm number 2 to 10 pertain to the second group.  The 
third group contains firm number 10. 
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Chapter 4 - The Impact of Incentive Regulation on the U.S. 
Telecommunications Industry: A Stochastic Frontier Approach 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the late 1980s, one of the most important trends in regulatory policy in the U.S. 
telecommunications industry has been the transition from traditional rate-of-return regulation 
(RRR) to alternative forms of regulation, so called incentive regulation (IR).60,61  Regulators in 
the telecommunications industry anticipated that the adoption of incentive regulation would 
lower prices, enhance technical innovation, encourage firms to operate with efficient technology 
and reduce the administrative costs of regulation. 
A large volume of research has examined the effects associated with the implementation 
of incentive regulations.62  Schmalensee and Rohlfs (1992) examined the effect of price cap 
regulation (PCR)63 on productivity gains.  They compared AT&T’s productivity gains on 
switched services in the period prior to the implementation of PCR (1986-1988) with the period 
following the implementation of PCR (1989-1991).  Schmalensee and Rholfs found that the 
                                                 
60 Economists have long criticized the incentive properties of RRR.  For example, Braeutigam and Panzar (1989) 
describe potential problems of RRR, including:  (1) incentives to misreport cost allocations; (2) choose an inefficient 
technology mix; (3) underinvestment in cost-reducing innovation; (4) underproduce in the non-core market; (5) 
inefficient diversification.  Sappington (2001) has analyzed potential flaws in RRR to include: (1) firms are not 
likely to perform fully in terms of  incentives for innovation and cost minimization; (2) over capitalization; (3) 
regulatory cost are high; (4) consumers bear excessive risk; (5) cost shifting; (6) distortion of diversification and 
innovation; (7) operate with inefficient technology; and (8) insufficient pricing flexibility. See also Weisman (1996) 
for a discussion of similar drawback associated with price cap regulation with earnings sharing.  
61 In this essay, we examine 4 different types of IR.  These are Earnings Sharing, Hybrid Price Caps, Price Caps, and 
Other Forms of IR.  See Sappington and Weisman (1996) for a discussion of incentive regulation in the 
telecommunications industry.  
62 Empirical analyses of the effects of incentive regulation have focused on performance metrics such as services 
prices, production costs, productivity, investment in infrastructure, service quality, company profits, service 
penetration rates and new services in the telecommunications industry.  See Kridel et al. (1996) for further review.  
63 PCR is the dominant regulatory regime among incentive regulation regimes. Substituting PCR for RRR provides 
for Pareto-superior change for all primary economic entities: the regulator, consumers, and competitors.  See 
Weisman (2000b). 
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cumulative productivity gains were $1.8 billion higher during the PCR period relative to the 
RRR period.64 
Majumdar (1997) employed a non-parametric approach, commonly referred to as data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), to examine the effect of incentive regulation on the productive 
performance of 45 local exchange carriers (LECs) over the period 1988-1993.  He showed that 
PCR has a positive but lagged effect on technical efficiency.65  Uri (2001) used a Malmquist 
index to measure the change in productivity growth following the implementation of incentive 
regulation.  He found that productivity growth increased by approximately 5 percent per year for 
the 19 LECs over the period 1988-1999.  
Although a number of empirical studies have concluded that the effect of incentive 
regulation on productivity growth in the U.S. telecommunications industry is substantially 
positive, some studies find that the effect of incentive regulation is ambiguous.  For example, 
Resende (1999)66 estimated a translog cost function combined with total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth decomposition for the period 1989-1994.  He found that incentive regulation did 
not enhance the level of productive efficiency.  Uri (2002) employed a corrected ordinary least 
                                                 
64 Kwoka (1993) analyzed the impact of different regulatory policies on productivity growth of British Telecom 
(BT).  He found empirical evidence that the combination of  privatization and price cap regulation for BT 
substantially affected productivity increases from 1984 to 1987. Tardiff and Taylor (1993) examined the effects of 
the implementation of incentive regulation on the local telecommunications firms in the U.S. They found that firms 
operating incentive regulation improved their annual total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate by 2.8 percentage 
points.  This increase is attributed to the gains in output productivity and reduction in the growth rate of input under 
incentive regulation.  Ai and Sappington (2002) used a fixed-effects estimation to examine the effect of incentive 
regulation on the U.S. telecommunications industry.  They find that the incentive regulation improves network 
modernization and lowered costs. 
65 Kang (2000) introduced both static and dynamic DEA to investigate the effects of the implementation of incentive 
regulatory regimes at the state level for 28 local exchange carriers (LECs) over the period 1988 and 1998.  He found 
that state level PCR had a positive effect on pure technical efficiency—an estimated improvement on average of 4 % 
in terms of the LECs’ technical efficiency.  Jung (2005) also employed both static and dynamic DEA to examine the 
effects of the implementation of incentive regulatory regimes for the period 1988-2000.  His empirical findings, 
including various efficiency scores, indicated that only pure price cap regulation has a positive influence on 
improving efficiency scores.  
66 Resende (2000) used DEA to analyze the impact of alternative forms of regulation in the U.S. telecommunications 
industry.  He found no empirical evidence in support of the claim that price cap regulation had a positive effect on 
technical efficiency.  
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squares (COLS) approach to measure the efficiency gains associated with the implementation of 
incentive regulation in the U.S. telecommunications industry.  Using data from 19 LECs over the 
1988-1999 time period, he found no empirical evidence that incentive regulation had enhanced 
technical efficiency. 
In an attempt to resolve the extant ambiguity in the literature concerning the effect of 
incentive regulation on productivity growth, this essay investigates whether the substitution of 
PCR along with other incentive regulatory regimes for RRR enhanced the productive efficiency 
in the U.S. telecommunications industry using a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).  Specifically, 
we measure the productivity growth for 25 local exchange carriers’ (LECs), inclusive of its 
underlying components -- technological progress and changes in technical efficiency over the 
period 1988 to 1998. 
This study has two principal objectives.  First, using SFA, this essay measures 
productivity growth associated with technological progress and changes in technical efficiency to 
examine the improvement in the LECs’ productivity growth.  Although previous studies provide 
some useful results in terms of productivity growth, employing the SFA approach differs from 
previous studies in material ways.  Second, this essay analyzes the effects associated with the 
adoption of incentive regulation on the LECs’ productivity growth rate.  
The remainder of this essay  is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the multiple 
output distance function and presents the models used in the study.  In Section 3, we discuss the 
data set, hypothesis tests and productivity growth changes.  The estimates of the factors, 
including various regulatory regime variables, that explain changes in productivity growth are 
presented and discussed in Section 4.  Section 5 provides a brief summary and conclusion. 
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THEORY OF STOCHASTIC FRONTIER ANALYSIS 
Distance Function 
To measure the production frontier, an output distance function is employed.  The main 
advantage of the distance function approach is that it allows for a multiple-input and multiple-
output technology without requiring price data, which is typically a constraint in working with 
telecommunications industry data.67   
In order to define the output distance function, we first introduce the production 
technology.  We assume that for each time period 1, , ,t T= …  the production technology tF maps 
input vectors, ntx +∈R , into output vectors, mty +∈R , 
 ( ){ }, :  can produce t t t t tF x y x y= ,       (1) 
whereR  is the set of real numbers.68  The production technology tF  is homogeneous of degree 
one in output.  Following Shepard (1970), the output distance function is defined at time t  as: 
( ) ( ){ }( ) 1, inf : , sup : ,t ttOt t t t t tyD x y x F x y Fθ θ θθ −⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞= ∈ = ∈⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭ .   (2) 
According to Lovell et al. (1994), the output distance function ( ),Ot t tD x y  is non-
decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous and convex in y and decreasing in x .69  Note that 
the input-output vectors lie below the production technology set.  This implies that 
                                                 
67 The distance function can be estimated in several ways.  These include data envelopment analysis (DEA), 
parametric deterministic linear programming (PLP), corrected ordinary least squares (COLS), and stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA). 
68 The production technology must satisfy following axioms in order to be a meaningful model of production: i) the 
possibility of inaction; ii) monotonicity of the output correspondence; iii) disposability of output iv); the output set is 
closed v); irreversibility (Färe, R., and S. Grosskopf. 1994). 
69 Refer to Coelli et al. (1998) for further discussion of distance functions. 
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( ), 1Ot t tD x y ≤  if and only if ( ), tt tx y F∈ .  Moreover, ( ), 1Ot t tD x y =  if and only if ( ),t tx y  lie on 
the boundary of the production technology set. 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
There are two main approaches employed in efficiency analysis: econometric methods and the 
non-parametric DEA method.  Depending upon the assumed property of the error term, the 
econometric method is categorized by a deterministic approach or a stochastic approach.  The 
main advantage of stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is that it accounts for the possible influence 
of noise on the shape and positioning of the frontier, something that deterministic frontier models 
are unable to do.  In other words, issues such as measurement error and other random factors can 
be separated from the sources of variation in technical efficiency.  SFA posits a production 
function with an error term associated with two components.  These two components consist of a 
symmetric error term accounting for noise and an asymmetric error term accounting for technical 
inefficiency.  
Based on Coelli and Perelman (2000), the multiple output distance function is specified 
in translog functional form and is given by: 
0
1 1 1 1
1ln( ) ln ln ln ln
2
J L J J
Oi j ij l il jk ij ik
j l j k
D y x y yα α β α
= = = =
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑∑  
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+ + =∑∑ ∑∑ …    (3) 
where J  is the number of outputs, L is the number of inputs, and i denotes the i th firm in the 
sample.  The restrictions required for homogeneity of degree one in outputs are 
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The restrictions required for symmetry are 
 ,         , 1, 2, ,jk kj j k Jα α= = …  and ,         , 1, 2, ,lm ml l m Lβ β= = … .   (6) 
Lovell et al. (1994) proposed a convenient method for imposing the homogeneity 
restriction in (3).  Homogeneity implies that  
( ) ( ), , ,O OD x y D x yλ λ=  for any 0λ > .      (7) 
Hence, we arbitrarily choose one of the outputs, and set 1
Jy
λ = , which allows us to obtain 
 ( ),, OO
J J
D x yyD x
y y
⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.        (8) 
The translog function can be written as: 
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where * ijij
iJ
y
y
y
= .  Equation (9) can be rewritten in the following functional form  
( ) ( )*ln( ) , , , lniJ Oiy TL y x Dα β− = − 70      (10)  
We append the noise term iv  and change the notation from ( )ln OiD  to iu− .  This 
transformation yields the stochastic frontier function associated with the time trend for the panel 
data and is expressed as follows: 
                                                 
70 Note that Doi =1 implies that the firm lies on the boundary of the frontier. 
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where 1,2, ,t T= …  is a time trend.  itY  and *ijty  are the output and arbitrarily normalized output 
for firm i , respectively.  Subscripts ,j k  index outputs; , ,α β δ  are parameters to be estimated; x  
variables are inputs.  Subscripts ,l m  index inputs; the itv s are the error components and are 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed as ( )20, vN σ .  The itu ’s are the technical 
inefficiency components.    
Following Battese and Coelli (1992), the technical inefficiency error term is defined by 
 ( )exp ,         1, 2, , ; 1, 2, ,it iu u t T i I t Tη= − − = =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ … … ,    (12) 
where the iu s are assumed to be a non-negative truncation of the normal distribution ( )2,N μμ σ  
associated with technical inefficiency in production.  iu  is the technical inefficiency effect for 
firm i  for the last period of the sample; η is an unknown parameter to be estimated and 
represents the rate of change in technical inefficiency.  Therefore, a positive value, 0η > , implies 
that the technical inefficiency effects are decreasing over time.72 One of the advantages of using 
                                                 
71 Note that as suggested by Morrison-Paul et al. (2000), one can change the sign of dependent variable.  This 
change allows for interpreting estimates that conform to the standard SFA framework. 
72 If η > 0 then - η (t-T) ≡  η(T-t) and it iu u> . However, the value of the exponential function is decreasing 
monotonically towards the value of the last period in the sample.  If η  = 0, the translog specification in (11) 
becomes a time-invariant inefficiency model. 
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the error term in (12) is that any technical inefficiency changes over time can be separated from 
technical change.   
Following Coelli et al. (1998) and given the estimates for (11) and (12), the technical 
efficiencies of production for each firm in the t th year can be predicted as: 
( )expit itTE u= − .73         (13) 
Therefore, the technical efficiency change between adjacent periods t  and s  is calculated as: 
 itit
is
TEEC
TE
= .          (14) 
With the estimates of the parameters in (11) and (12), the index of the technological 
change for firm i  is calculated by evaluating the partial derivative of the production function 
with respect to time.  The calculation of technological change is computed according to: 
( ) ( )* * * * * *, , , , , , , ,
1 1is is it itit
f y x t f y x t
TC
s t
α β α β⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= + × +∂ ∂⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
.   (15) 
Finally, the TFP index can be obtained by the product of the index of technical efficiency 
change and the index of technological change calculated from (14) and (15): 
it it itTFP EC TC= × .         (16) 
Data and Productivity Growth 
The data used in this analysis represent a balanced panel that consists of annual data for 25 
ILECs over the 1988-1998 period.74  The primary sources of data are obtained from the 
                                                 
73 The predicted values of technical efficiency lie between zero and one.  A value of one implies that the firm lies on 
the boundary of the production possibility set.  
74 Starting with the year 1988, the accounting system that tracks these data was changed.   
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Electronic ARMIS Filing System and the Statistics of Communications Common Carriers 
maintained by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC).75   
 Local calls, intraLATA toll calls, and interLATA toll calls are the output variables since 
these are the core services provided by ILECs. 76 The measures of inputs are the total number of 
switches, the number of access lines, and the number of employees.77  The use of these three 
inputs captures the actual industry characteristics for producing telephone service.  
We use a stochastic frontier model with homogeneity imposed on (9).  IntraLATA toll 
calls are chosen as the output measure used to normalize all other outputs.  We therefore specify 
the variables used in (11) as follows:  
 Y  is intraLATA toll calls; 
*
1y  is local calls divided by intraLATA toll calls; 
*
2y  is interLATA toll calls divided by intraLATA calls; 
1x  is number of switches; 
2x  is number of access lines; 
            and 3x  is number of employees. 
The test results for various null hypotheses presented in Table 1 are conducted using log-
likelihood ratio (LR) tests.78   Given the stochastic frontier specification, we first test for changes 
                                                 
75 ARMIS is the acronym for Automated Reporting Management Information System.  One may refer to 
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/armis to access the data set.  FCC Report 43-02, the ARMIS USOA Report, FCC Report 
43-07, the ARMIS Infrastructure Report and FCC Report 43-08, the ARMIS Operating Data Report were used to 
populate the data set.  
76 As part of the break up of AT&T in 1984, the U.S. was partitioned into approximately 161 local access transport 
areas or LATAs.  The RBOCs were restricted to providing intraLATA long distance service which essentially meant 
that they could not provide long distance service across area code boundaries.  Section 271 of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act specified the terms and conditions that would enable the RBOCs to re-enter the interLATA 
long distance market.  
77 Majumdar (1997) also introduced the same classification for outputs and inputs. 
78 The LR test statistic is calculated by -2x[L(H0) - L(HA)], where L(H0)  and L(HA) are the log-likelihood values 
under the null and alternative hypotheses, respectively. 
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in technical inefficiency.  The null hypothesis ( )0γ μ η= = =  is rejected at the 1% significance 
level.  This implies that OLS does not fit the actual frontier well due to the technical inefficiency 
effects.  The second null hypothesis, that there is no technological change, is strongly rejected.  
This result suggests that technological change exists in the model.  The third hypothesis test that 
technical inefficiency effects have a half-normal distribution is also rejected.  The last set of 
hypothesis tests focuses on whether technical inefficiency is time-invariant.  This hypothesis is 
rejected at the 1% level of statistical significance, implying that there is no time-invariance in 
technical inefficiency.  
Table 2 reports the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the parameters in the 
translog stochastic frontier production function defined by (11) and (12).  Note that the 
parameter γ
2
2 2
μ
μ ν
σγ σ σ
⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 is the ratio of the error variances from (11).  Therefore, the value of 
γ  must lie between zero and one.  If 0γ = , no technical inefficiency is present, while 1γ =  
indicates that there exists no random noise.  Thus, our estimate of γ =0.853 implies that the 
technical inefficiency component dominates the random noise component.  The significant and 
positive estimate of the time varying inefficiency effect, 0.0292η = , indicates that the technical 
inefficiency effects are monotonically decreasing over time.  These results further substantiate 
the claim that there are time variant technical inefficiency effects in the error term that are 
decreasing over time.  
Table 3 reports the indices for the sample mean of technical efficiency, technological 
change, and productivity growth changes for the period from 1988 to 1998.  The index of 
efficiency change is greater than one over this time period.  The estimates of the inefficiency 
error term indicate that technical efficiency has occurred at a positive rate while the rate of 
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growth decreased continuously during the sample period.  The index for technological change 
decreases until 1991 and then reflects an overall improvement in technology.  In addition, 
technological change is a dominant factor in the decomposition.  Thus, the sample mean for the 
productivity growth change, which declined initially, is increasing from 1991.  This may be 
attributed to the change in the regulatory regime since price cap regulation for interstate access 
went into effect in 1991.       
Table 4 presents the measures for average productivity, efficiency, and technological 
change for each individual firm during the 1988-1990 and 1991-1998 periods.  Since price caps 
for interstate access went into effect in 1991, it is important to determine whether the adoption of 
this new regulatory regime affects productivity growth over the 1991-1998 time period.    
Each LEC in the sample, with the exception of Qwest, experienced increases in mean 
technological change following the implementation of the incentive regulatory regime.  This 
result implies that there was improvement in technology.  In addition, with the exception of 
Qwest and Illinois Bell, each individual firm experienced an increase in annual productivity 
growth.  For example, Pacific Bell-California experienced a 4.1 percent average growth in 
productivity over the period 1991-1998, but only a 1.4 percent average growth in productivity 
prior to 1991.  It is noteworthy that only Verizon Hawaii experienced negative growth in 
productivity in both sample periods, although Verizon Hawaii improved its performance over the 
sample periods.  These empirical findings strongly suggest that the substitution of incentive 
regulation for traditional RRR enhanced performance in the U.S. telecommunications industry 
over the sample periods.  In the next section, we discuss the relationship between productivity 
growth change and selected independent variables.  
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THE EFFECTS OF PCR ON THE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH CHANGE 
 Regulatory Regime Variables 
In this essay, the various regulatory regimes are classified into five groups:  rate of return (RRR), 
earnings sharing (ESHARE), hybrid price caps (HPCR), pure price caps (PCR), and other 
incentive regulations (OIR).  RRR includes only traditional RRR.  ESHARE contains all forms 
of earnings sharing such as banded rate of return with earnings sharing.  Price caps with earnings 
sharing and revenue sharing are categorized by HPCR.  Price caps with pricing flexibility and 
indexed price caps are classified as PCR.  OIR contains banded RRR, rate freeze (with pricing 
flexibility) and all other hybrid types of incentive regulation.79 
It should be noted that there is a measurement issue associated with matching each firm 
with a particular regulatory regime.  That is, LECs that operates across different states may be 
subject to disparate regulatory regimes.  For example, in 1988, Qwest, then-US West, operated 
15 local companies over 14 different states.  Qwest in Colorado was under RRR with pricing 
flexibility while Qwest in Idaho was under traditional RRR.  To solve this problem, we use the 
percentage ratio of a firm’s total loops in a specific state to that firm’s total number of loops in 
different states as a proxy.80 
Control Variables 
In addition to the regulatory regime variables, we introduce 8 explanatory variables: FIBER, 
TOLLC, BSLINE, SIZE, BELL, HUMCAP, CORCO, and COCS.81   
FIBER is used to control for the effects of network modernization.  There are two 
principal technology types in the development of telecommunications networks:  transmission 
                                                 
79 We follow Kang (2000)’s classification. The data source is based on Abel and Clements (1998). 
80 Based on Kang (2000) and Resende (2000), we employ these regulatory variables. 
81 Control variables used in this essay are based on Majumdar (1997) and Kang (2000) with a few exceptions as 
noted.  
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facilities and switching facilities.  Due to data limitations, we compute the ratio of sheath 
kilometers of fiber deployed in the cable to sheath kilometers of total cable as a measure of 
network modernization.     
TOLLC is computed as the percentage ratio of number of toll calls to total number of 
calls.  TOLLC is used to control for the effects of competition in long distance service. 
BSLINE is used to control for the effects of competition in the exchange access service 
market.  Bypass is a form of competition in local exchange access markets which can lead to 
pronounced losses in LEC revenues without corresponding reductions in LEC costs.82  Business 
customers tend to have greater opportunities to bypass the local network because of their location 
in the urban cores with high teledensity (local loops per square mile).  Thus, this measure is 
computed as the percentage ratio of business access lines to total access lines. 
SIZE is employed as an explanatory variable to control for scale effects among LECs.  
SIZE is computed as the log of deflated total revenue.83  
BELL is used to distinguish regional bell operating company (RBOC) and independent 
LECs.  BELL is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the LEC is an RBOC and the 
value of 0 otherwise. 
HUMCAP is used to capture the difference in worker quality among the LECs.  In theory, 
high-quality employees are likely to receive a higher rate of compensation, whereas low quality 
                                                 
82 The nature of the telecommunications production process is that the vast majority of costs are incurred in 
providing for the option of use rather than actual use.   This implies, of course, that reductions in demand and 
revenues do not translate into comparable reduction in LEC costs.  As Mitchell and Vogelsang (1997, p. 9) observe:  
In telecommunications networks, production facilities have well-determined capacities, and the costs of 
operation are nearly independent of the flow of services through those facilities . . . Consequently, . . . 
variable costs are very small.   
83 Total revenues are deflated by the CPI for overall telephone services (base year = 1984).  
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employees are likely to receive a  somewhat lower rate of compensation.  Thus, as a proxy for 
worker quality, we use average real compensation per employee.84 
CORCO is used to control for the effects of differences in the firm’s long-run business 
investment.  This variable is computed as the percentage ratio of planning, human resources, and 
research and development expenses to total operating expenses.  
COCS is used to explain the effects of differences in the LEC’s level of customer service.  
The higher the quality of service the firm provides the higher the demand for its services, ceteris 
paribus.  As a proxy for the firm’s level of customer service, we use the percentage ratio of 
customer operating expenses to total operating expenses.85 
Econometric specification 
In the previous section, we defined the regulatory regime variables along with seven explanatory 
variables.  In this section, we turn to investigate the relationship between productivity growth 
change and the regulatory regime variables.  In addition, it is interesting to ascertain whether the 
lagged values of the regulatory variables have substantially influenced the firm’s performance in 
the near term since the change in regulatory policy and the individual firm’s reaction to the new 
policy may occur over time.  Thus, our model includes two-period lagged regulatory variables 
and is specified as follows: 
4 2 8
, , , ,
1 0 1
it j t l j i t l k k it it
j l k
TFP R Xα β δ ε− −
= = =
= + + +∑∑ ∑     (17) 
 2~ (0, )it N εε σ  
                                                 
84 To obtain real compensation of labor, total compensation of labor was deflated by the employment cost indexes in 
communications obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
85 Summary statistics for the explanatory variables are reported in Table 5.  
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where the subscript i indexes the individual firm.  itTFP  is the total factor productivity index in 
the t th year, and , ,j i t lR −  represents a dummy variable for the j th regulatory regime in the t-k th 
year.  ,k itX  represents the kth control variable, as defined in the previous section, in the t-k th 
year.  , ,α β δ  are parameters to be estimated.  itε  is the error term. 
Generally speaking, our a priori expectation is that FIBER, TOLLC, BELL, HUMCAP, 
CORCO, and COCS will have positive effects, while BSLINE will have negative effects.  The 
OLS estimates of these regulatory variables along with the control variables are reported in Table 
6.  Model 1 includes no time lags, while Model 2 and Model 3 include a one-period time lag and 
a two-period time lag, respectively. 
Except ESHRE, all estimates of the incentive regulation regime variables in Model 1 are 
positive and statistically significant.  This implies that the adoption of incentive regulation has a 
positive effect on productivity growth.  It is noteworthy that the coefficient on PCR indicates a 
substantially positive relationship with TFP growth.  Moreover, only PCR is positively related to 
productivity growth at the 1% significance level in all three models.  That is PCR shows a 
consistent result across the various specification of the time lag.  This result implies that there is 
a pronounced positive effect of PCR on productivity growth.  In practice, PCR plays an 
instrumental role in enhancing productivity growth relative to the other regulatory regimes. 
FIBER is positively related to the productivity growth change at the 1% significance 
level in all three models.  This indicates that network modernization in the form of investment in 
fiber optic cables positively enhanced productivity growth. 
The contribution of toll call (TOLLC) to productivity growth has a positive impact and is 
significant at the 1% significance level in all three models.  Since toll markets are more lucrative 
than local markets, increasing competition in the toll service market induces more entry in the 
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market.  Thus, firms operating with a high proportion of toll services are likely to encounter 
intense competition that, in turn, drives them to be more productive. 
Business line (BSLINE) is negatively related to productivity growth.  Business markets 
are more susceptible to bypass competition due to high measures of teledensity.  This can lead to 
a large loss of LEC revenues without a corresponding reduction in LEC costs.   
Baby Bells (BELL) variable is positively related to the change in productivity growth. 
This implies that regional bell operating companies (RBOCs) performed better in terms of 
productivity growth change relative to non-RBOCs. 
On the other hand, corporate cost (CORCO) is negatively related to the change in 
productivity growth at the 1% significance level in all three models.  This result implies that 
increasing levels of investment in human capital and research has no measurable, positive impact 
on productivity growth.  Rather, physical (capital) investment may be the dominant factor in 
terms of enhancing production performance in the telecommunications industry. 
The human capital (HUMCAP), customer cost (COCS) and SIZE are negatively related 
to productivity growth.  However, with the lone exception of model 3, these estimates are not 
statistically significant. 
CONCLUSION 
The pervasive adoption of PCR and IR is one of the outstanding achievements of 
regulatory economics in the United States and throughout the western world.  In theory, PCR is 
superior to RRR in that it provides stronger incentives for operating efficiency.  The theoretical 
literature notwithstanding, the empirical evidence concerning the effect of incentive regulation 
on productivity growth has been mixed.   Hence, the primary objective of this essay is to 
investigate whether the implementation of PCR along with other regulatory regime variables has 
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had a positive effect on productivity growth in the U.S. telecommunications industry.  In 
addition, this essay employs a stochastic frontier approach, which differs from previous studies, 
to compute efficiency change, technological progress, and productivity growth for 25 LECs over 
the 1988-1998 sample periods.  
Every LEC in the sample, with the exception of Qwest, experienced an increase in mean 
technological change following the implementation of incentive regulation.  Furthermore, with 
the exception of Qwest and Illinois Bell, each firm in the sample experienced an increase in 
annual productivity growth following the implementation of incentive regulation.  This may 
imply that the adoption of PCR and IR, more generally, has had positive impact on operating 
performance in the U.S. telecommunications industry. 
By examining the relationship between productivity growth, regulatory regime variables 
and a set of control variables, we find that PCR and other regulatory regimes have a positive 
effect on productivity growth.  However, only PCR has a significant and positive effect on 
productivity growth in both contemporaneous and lagged model specifications.    
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Table 4.1 LR Tests of hypotheses for parameters of stochastic production frontier model 
No Null Hypothesis Test statistics Critical value Decision 
(1) 0γ μ η= = =  216.554 10.501* Reject 0H  
(2) 1 2 1 2 3 0T TT T T T T Tα α α α β β β= = = = = = =  92.333 27,0.01 18.475χ =  Reject 0H  
(3) 0μ =  88.835 21,0.01 6.63χ =  Reject 0H  
(4) 0η =  8.403 21,0.01 6.63χ =  Reject 0H  
* The critical values for this test are obtained from Table 1 of Kodde and Palm (1986) for mixed 2,0.01vχ . 
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Table 4.2 Estimated Parameters for Stochastic Production Frontier Model 
 
 
Log-likelihood = 355.7185                    
 Number of observations = 275   
Number of firms = 25 
Number of years = 11   
Parameters Coefficient Standard error 
0α  -4.9072*** 1.0336 
Tα  -0.3616*** 0.0796 
1α  -3.2244*** 0.3102 
2α  2.5044*** 0.4299 
1β  2.5263*** 0.678 
2β  1.9386*** 0.5842 
3β  -4.0434*** 0.9954 
TTα  -0.0034*** 0.001 
11α  0.3834*** 0.0237 
22α  0.312*** 0.0464 
12α  -0.3043*** 0.0347 
11β  0.1631*** 0.0393 
22β  -0.7495*** 0.1564 
33β  -0.9752*** 0.243 
12β  -0.3336*** 0.0971 
13β  0.1401* 0.0816 
23β  0.9273*** 0.2004 
1Tα  -0.0637*** 0.0114 
2Tα  0.058*** 0.0121 
1Tβ  0.032** 0.0143 
2Tβ  0.1638*** 0.0309 
3Tβ  -0.1839*** 0.0361 
11δ  0.0507 0.0563 
12δ  0.9853*** 0.1266 
13δ  -0.9024*** 0.1439 
21δ  -0.105* 0.0555 
22δ  -0.7191*** 0.1417 
23δ  0.7901*** 0.1569 μ  0.2623*** 0.032 η  0.0292*** 0.0071 
2 2 2/( )μ μ νγ σ σ σ= +  0.8534 0.0242 
( )2 2 2μ νσ σ σ= +  0.0202 0.0017 
Note: *** = significant at 1% level (p<0.01). 
          ** = significant at 5% level (p<0.05). 
          * = significant at 10% level (p<0.10). 
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Table 4.3 Sample Mean of Technical Efficiency Change, Technological Change, and 
Productivity Growth Change Using a Stochastic Frontier Approach 
Year Efficiency change technological change productivity growth change 
1988 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1989 1.012 0.995 1.007 
1990 1.011 0.994 1.006 
1991 1.011 0.993 1.004 
1992 1.011 0.998 1.009 
1993 1.011 1.004 1.015 
1994 1.010 1.013 1.023 
1995 1.010 1.025 1.036 
1996 1.010 1.033 1.043 
1997 1.009 1.035 1.045 
1998 1.009 1.036 1.045 
 Note: Indices for year 1988 reflect change between 1987 and 1988. Since no data is available prior to 1988 
in our sample, we assign a value 1. 
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Table 4.4 Mean Technical Efficiency Change, Technological Change, and Productivity Growth 
Change, 1988-1990 and 1991-1998 
1988-1990 1991-1998 
Firm # Firm 
Technological 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Productivity 
change 
Technological 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Productivity 
change 
1 Qwest Corporation  1.022 1.010 1.033* 1.015 1.009 1.024 
2 AT&T/Southwestern Bell  0.985 1.016 1.001 1.000 1.014 1.014 
3 Pacific Bell - California  0.999 1.015 1.014 1.027 1.013 1.041 
4 AT&T/SNET  0.970 1.018 0.988 0.989 1.016 1.004 
5 Illinois Bell  1.018 1.014 1.032 1.018 1.012 1.031 
6 Indiana Bell  1.020 1.012 1.032 1.034 1.011 1.045 
7 Michigan Bell  1.018 1.016 1.034 1.026 1.014 1.040 
8 Ohio Bell  1.016 1.015 1.032 1.022 1.013 1.036 
9 Wisconsin Bell  1.018 1.010 1.028 1.032 1.009 1.041 
10 AT&T/BellSouth  0.990 1.018 1.008 1.008 1.015 1.023 
11 Verizon Washington D.C.  0.958 1.013 0.971 0.995 1.011 1.006 
12 Verizon Maryland  0.991 1.014 1.004 1.027 1.012 1.039 
13 Verizon Virginia  1.003 1.012 1.015 1.034 1.010 1.045 
14 Verizon West Virginia  0.981 1.007 0.988 1.006 1.006 1.012 
15 Verizon Delaware LLC  1.025 1.004 1.029 1.045 1.003 1.048 
16 Verizon Pennsylvania  1.026 1.012 1.038 1.038 1.010 1.049 
17 Verizon New Jersey  1.013 1.017 1.030 1.043 1.015 1.058 
18 Verizon New England  1.016 1.011 1.027 1.032 1.010 1.042 
19 Verizon New York  1.000 1.001 1.001 1.007 1.000 1.007 
20 Verizon Florida LLC  0.969 1.003 0.972 0.999 1.002 1.001 
21 Verizon Hawaii  0.900 1.006 0.906 0.946 1.005 0.951 
22 Verizon North, Inc.  0.992 1.014 1.006 1.022 1.012 1.034 
23 Verizon Northwest, Inc.  0.996 1.011 1.007 1.021 1.010 1.031 
24 Verizon South, Inc.  0.974 1.013 0.986 1.022 1.012 1.034 
25 GTE of The Southwest, Inc.  0.967 1.009 0.976 1.019 1.008 1.027 
Note: 1) The mean is the geometric mean. 
         2) 1.033 implies a 3.3% annual growth in productivity over the period 1988-1990.  
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Table 4.5 Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
Independent Variable MEAN STDV MIN MAX 
ESHARE Earnings Sharing 0.29 0.42 0.00 1.00 
HPCR Hybrid Price Cap Regulation 0.17 0.34 0.00 1.00 
PCR Price Cap Regulation 0.06 0.22 0.00 1.00 
OIR Other Incentive Regulation 0.26 0.42 0.00 1.00 
FIBER Fiber Km per Sheath Km of Cable 6.33 3.62 0.02 16.48 
TOLLC % Toll Calls 15.34 7.23 3.35 89.78 
BSLINE % Business Access Lines 31.41 8.74 16.80 69.61 
SIZE Logged Total Revenue 26.73 27.04 1.83 122.84 
BELL Regional Operating Bell Company 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
HUMCAP Compensation per Employee (in thousands) 70.57 9.40 15.60 104.27 
CORCO % R & D Expenses 1.75 0.51 0.87 3.14 
COCS % Customer Operations Expenses 18.21 3.24 12.20 26.90 
 
 81
Table 4.6 Factors Explaining Productivity Growth Change 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 Coefficient Expected Sign 
 Coefficient Expected sign 
 Coefficient Expected sign 
CONSTANT 1.0101***   1.013***   1.0119***  
 (0.0166)   (0.0166)   (0.0171)  
OIR 0.0104**   0.0052   0.0028  
 (0.0049)   (0.0072)   (0.0073)  
OIR t-1    0.0069   -0.0006  
    (0.0068)   (0.0089)  
OIR t-2       0.0113*  
       (0.0062)  
ESHARE 0.0084   0.0023   -0.0002  
 (0.0052)   (0.007)   (0.0068)  
ESHARE t-1    0.009   0.0025  
    (0.0068)   (0.0082)  
ESHARE t-2       0.0106*  
       (0.0063)  
HPCR 0.0231***   -0.0011   -0.0073  
 (0.007)   (0.0116)   (0.0108)  
HPCR t-1    0.0316***   -0.0002  
    (0.0119)   (0.0146)  
HPCR t-2       0.0331***  
       (0.00109)  
PCR 0.027***   0.0211***   0.0173***  
 (0.005)   (0.0072)   (0.0068)  
PCR t-1    0.0096   0.0045  
    (0.0073)   (0.0084)  
PCR t-2       0.0083  
       (0.0069)  
FIBER 0.0018*** O  0.0017*** O  0.0016*** O 
 (0.0005)   (0.0005)   (0.0006)  
TOLLC 0.1405*** O  0.1361*** O  0.256*** O 
 (0.0194)   (0.0194)   (0.0265)  
BSLINE -0.0635*** O  -0.0616*** O  -0.0381 O 
 (0.0194)   (0.0195)   (0.0191)  
SIZE -3.49E-08   -5.76E-08   -7.32E-08  
 (6.05E-08)   (6.12E-08)   (5.93E-08)  
BELL 0.0222*** O  0.0227*** O  0.0236*** O 
 (0.0047)   (0.0047)   (0.0046)  
HUMCAP -0.0042 X  -0.0117 X  -0.0402** X 
 (0.0163)   (0.0166)   (0.0171)  
CORCO -1.0197*** X  -0.9634*** X  -0.8206** X 
 (0.3553)   (0.3542)   (0.3501)  
COCS -0.0405 X  -0.0383 X  -0.071 X 
 (0.0511)   (0.0514)   (0.0478)  
Adjusted R2 0.5585   0.5648   0.6451  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
         O (X) indicates that expected signs and actual signs are the same (different) 
          *** = significant at 1% level.   ** = significant at 5% level.    * = significant at 10% level. 
 82
CHAPTER 5 - Conclusion 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three empirical essays that investigate the effect of 
mergers and regulation in the U.S. telecommunications industry.  The first two essays, chapters 2 
and 3, respectively, address the effect of a series of mergers in the telecommunications industry 
following the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act (1996 Act).  The third essay, chapter 
4, investigates the effect of the implementation of incentive regulation in the telecommunications 
industry.  
The primary objective of chapter 2 is to determine whether productivity growth has 
increased among ILECs that have merged since the 1996 Telecommunications Act and whether 
the merged firms performed better than firms that did not merge in terms of productivity growth 
during the period 1996-2005.  The empirical results of this chapter suggest that mergers 
positively affected average productivity growth over the sample period. 
The primary objective of Chapter 3 is to evaluate the effectiveness of mergers that 
occurred between 1996 and 2005 using SFA.  This chapter also compares productivity growth 
results between the SFA and the Malmquist index approach.  Both methods indicate that every 
firm in the sample has experienced negative annual growth in technological change.  
Furthermore, both methods indicate that most of the firms in the sample experience negative 
annual productivity growth following the merger. 
Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that consolidation reduces deterioration in productivity growth.  
This result is of potential value to both government and industry as further consolidation may be 
in the offing. 
The primary objective of Chapter 4 is to measure productivity growth associated with 
technological progress and changes in technical efficiency in order to examine the improvement 
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in the LECs’ productivity growth following the adoption of incentive regulation.  The results of 
Chapter 4 indicate that the adoption of PCR and IR, more generally, has had positive impact on 
operating performance in the U.S. telecommunications industry.  In addition, PCR has a 
significant and positive effect on productivity growth in both contemporaneous and lagged 
model specifications. 
Chapter 4, in contrast to the other literature, provides strong empirical evidence in 
support of the theoretical literature concerning the superiority of price cap over traditional rate-of 
-return regulation. 
Broadly speaking, the contributions of this dissertation are two fold.  First, measuring the 
efficiency gains associated with consolidation in the U.S. telecommunications industry has been 
given relatively little attention in the literature heretofore.  Two of the essays address whether the 
efficiency gains expected from these mergers were, in fact, realized.  Second, the stochastic 
frontier analysis employed in this dissertation has not been applied pervasively in the analysis of 
the telecommunications sector.  Therefore, these three empirical essays collectively provide a 
rigorous analysis of timely issues that may be employed by regulators charged with 
implementing public policy in the telecommunications sector—a sector of the economy that is 
responsible for a significant and increasing share of gross domestic product.86  
                                                 
86 According to Bureau of Economic Analysis, the broadcasting and telecommunications sector in the U.S. 
generated $304.1 billion dollars of GDP in 2005.  
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